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Enforcing Conservation Easements: The Through
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INTRODUCTION
“Through line: a common or consistent element or theme shared by items in a
series or by parts of a whole.”1

Conservation easements now dominate private land conservation efforts in the
United States. Billions of dollars of public funds are invested in them annually
through tax-incentive and easement purchase programs.2 More than forty million
* Nancy A. McLaughlin is the Robert W. Swenson Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law. © 2022, Nancy A. McLaughlin.
1. Through Line, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/MFG3-UPTN (last visited Aug. 13, 2021).
2. See infra Part I.B.
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acres are estimated to be subject to conservation easements, which is an area
more than eighteen times the size of Yellowstone National Park and larger than
the states of New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined.3 Hundreds of
government entities and charitable conservation organizations are focusing their
efforts on acquiring and stewarding conservation easements.4 In addition,
President Biden’s plan to protect 30% of the nation’s lands and waters by 2030—
the “America the Beautiful” initiative—is expected to accelerate the pace of conservation easement acquisitions.5 By any reasonable accounting, conservation
easements would appear to be a major success story.
But a significant risk to conservation easements and the benefits they provide
to the public lurks just beneath the surface: in enforcement cases, courts tend to
treat conservation easements as if they are traditional servitudes, like right-ofway easements between neighbors, even though they are clearly distinguishable.6
This tendency can have pernicious effects. Traditional servitudes principles were
developed to facilitate the marketability and development of land and to resolve
disputes between private parties. Applying those principles to conservation

3. See Conservation Easements and the National Conservation Easement Database, NAT’L
CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, https://perma.cc/YNL5-CCGZ (last visited Aug. 13, 2021); Park
Facts, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/NSC2-H3KV (last visited Aug. 13. 2021); State Area
Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/WR7A-SM45
(last visited Aug. 13, 2021).
4. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK 7–8 (Land Trust All., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK] (“Conservation easements are often the tool of choice for the nation’s 1,537 land trusts . . .
Hundreds of public agencies across the country also hold conservation easements.”); National
Conservation Easement Database Mapping Application, NAT’L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE,
https://www.conservationeasement.us/interactivemap/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2022) (containing location,
number of acres, and nonprofit or public agency holder data for conservation easements throughout the
United States); Find a Land Trust, LAND TRUST ALL., https://www.findalandtrust.org/land-trusts (last
visited Mar. 7, 2022) (containing data on the number of acres encumbered by conservation easements
held by individual land trusts).
5. See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619, § 216(a) (Feb. 1, 2021); U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., COUNCIL ON ENVT’L QUALITY, CONSERVING AND
RESTORING AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL (2021), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/report-conservingand-restoring-america-the-beautiful-2021.pdf.
6. See, e.g., infra Part II.C, discussing Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Water Works Bd. of Birmingham,
_ So.3d _, 2022 WL 571047 (Ala. 2022), in which the court applied the common law doctrine of merger
to hold that an entity could not establish and hold a conservation easement on property that it owned;
infra Part II.E, discussing Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016),
in which the court held that the common law principle that restrictive covenants are to be strictly
construed in favor of free use of property applied to conservation easements. See also Michael Allan
Wolf, Conservation Easements and the “Term Creep” Problem, 3 UTAH L. REV. 787 (2013) (discussing
the hazards associated with applying concepts applicable to traditional easements to the statutory
creation we know as “conservation easements”). For other concerns associated with the use of
conservation easements, see, e.g., K. King Burnett, John D. Leshy & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Building
Better Conservation Easements for America the Beautiful, 45 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (2021),
https://harvardelr.com/2021/09/15/building-better-conservation-easements-for-america-the-beautiful/.
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easements, the purpose of which is to constrain development to provide conservation benefits to the public, will often be directly contrary to the public interest.
It is critical to address this risk now because we are likely to see a significant
uptick in enforcement cases in the coming years. The dramatic growth in the use
of conservation easements in the United States began roughly three decades ago.7
Many existing conservation easements have significantly aged and the lands they
encumber are changing hands. As new owners who were not involved in the easements’ creation take possession of the restricted lands, we can expect to see an
increase in violations, in questions regarding interpretation of the easements’
terms, and in outright challenges to the easements’ validity.
How courts resolve these cases will profoundly impact the effectiveness of
conservation easements as land protection tools. It also will have a profound
impact on conservation efforts in this country generally, given that conservation easements have in many cases displaced other conservation measures,
such as fee acquisition and regulation. If, for example, courts extinguish conservation easements via the doctrine of merger, or bar holders from enforcing
them on laches or estoppel grounds, or interpret them in favor of free use of
property rather than to carry out their conservation purposes, many of the conservation gains that were made over the last three decades could end up being
ephemeral.
The goal of this Article is to help ensure that does not happen by providing a
solid foundation for the next chapter in conservation easement enforcement. This
Article builds that foundation in two ways.
This Article first explains the special status of conservation easements—why
they are fundamentally different from traditional servitudes. Three characteristics
of conservation easements most clearly distinguish them from traditional servitudes. Conservation easements are validated under state law only if they are structured to provide benefits to the public. The public heavily subsidizes the creation
of conservation easements through tax-incentive and easement purchase programs. And conservation easements are not true easements despite the “conservation easement” moniker; they are peculiar hybrids. Although conservation
easements are interests in real property, they also generally are created under the
auspices of a state enabling statute, they often are conveyed in whole or in part
as charitable gifts, and they typically are structured to comply with rules governing tax-incentive or easement purchase programs, thus implicating various
bodies of law. This Article explains the three distinguishing characteristics of
conservation easements and the various bodies of law relevant to conservation
easement enforcement.

7. See NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN, UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT STUDY COMMITTEE
BACKGROUND REPORT 5–6 (June 11, 2017) (unpublished report prepared for the Uniform Law
Commission) [hereinafter UCEA BACKGROUND REPORT], https://perma.cc/3RLX-9UVQ.
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This Article then walks through the handful of cases decided over the past
three decades in which the courts expressly recognized the special status of conservation easements. In one of the cases, it was the dissenting judges who did so,
but their position was later validated by the state legislature, which overruled the
majority by statute. To date, no one has brought these cases together to highlight
their collective wisdom and help chart a path forward for conservation easement
enforcement; this Article does that.
The cases discussed herein involve a variety of different issues. In two cases,
the courts determined that old common law rules barring the creation and
enforcement of easements in gross should not apply to conservation easements.
In one, a court refused to apply laches or estoppel to bar a government entity
from enforcing a conservation easement despite a significant enforcement delay,
illustrating that such defenses should apply only in the most extraordinary of circumstances. In another, a court determined that government and nonprofit holders
should simply be immune from the defenses of laches and estoppel when they are
enforcing conservation easements. One court held that a conservation easement
should not be extinguished under the doctrine of merger. Another determined that
a perpetual restriction on subdivision in a conservation easement was valid despite being a restraint on alienability. And in the final case, the dissenting judges
determined that the common law principle that restrictive covenants must be
strictly construed in favor of free use of property should not apply to conservation
easements.
Despite the different issues addressed in these cases, there is a clear unifying theme—a “through line.”8 The courts (in one case, the dissenting judges)
recognized that, because conservation easements are created to benefit the
public and carry out legislatively stated public purposes, they are fundamentally different from traditional servitudes. The courts also understood that,
because of this special status, it would be contrary to the public interest to
blindly apply to conservation easements principles developed to facilitate
the marketability and development of land or to resolve disputes between
private parties. This Article highlights these cases and the through line connecting them in the hope that it will catalyze courts to take a more consistent
and appropriate approach in the enforcement cases to come—one that
expressly recognizes and is informed by the special status of conservation
easements.
The cases discussed herein, and the individual stories they tell, also provide
courts, policymakers, and the public with a clear idea of what is at stake in the
conservation easement enforcement context. For example, the cases addressing
laches and estoppel provide a window into the significant challenges nonprofit
and government holders face in enforcing conservation easements. They also
illustrate the negative consequences of barring enforcement on laches or estoppel
8. See Through Line, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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grounds, including that it would encourage property owners to violate easements
and play a kind of “enforcement lottery.” The undesirable consequences of extinguishing conservation easements through merger are highlighted, including that
it would circumvent strict limits that have been placed on extinguishment to protect the public interest. Also discussed are the unwelcome effects of construing
conservation easements in favor of free use of property. Such a rule of construction would, among other things, provide property owners with a powerful
incentive to challenge or violate conservation easement restrictions and
provide nonprofit and government holders with an equally powerful disincentive to seek to enforce the restrictions on behalf of the public.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage for
the discussion of the cases by outlining the three characteristics of conservation easements that most clearly distinguish them from traditional servitudes. In addition to explaining the historical underpinnings of the state
enabling statutes, the scale of the public investment, and the hybrid nature
of conservation easements, Part I provides a roadmap of the various bodies
of law that may be relevant in conservation easement enforcement cases.
Part II then turns to the cases, focusing on the through line and the harm to
the public from not recognizing the special status of conservation easements. A final section briefly concludes.
I. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
To fully appreciate the cases discussed in Part II, some background on
conservation easements and their special status is needed. Conservation
easements differ from traditional servitudes in numerous ways, but three
characteristics most clearly distinguish them. First, conservation easements
are validated under state law only if they are structured to benefit the public.
Second, because conservation easements are intended to benefit the public,
the public heavily subsidizes their creation. Third, conservation easements
are hybrids. Although they bear the “easement” moniker, for many purposes
they are easements in name only and applying traditional servitudes law to
them is problematic because of the public interest at stake. Moreover,
because of their hybrid nature, various other bodies of law will generally be
relevant to their enforcement, including the state enabling statutes, charitable
gift law, federal tax law, and the rules governing conservation easement purchase programs. These three distinguishing characteristics of conservation
easements are explained more fully below.
A.

CREATED TO BENEFIT THE PUBLIC

Conservation easements are validated under state law only if they are structured to benefit the public. To understand why this is so, a review of some common law concepts applicable to servitudes is necessary.
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Historically, courts disfavored land use restrictions because they were viewed
as adversely affecting the development and marketability of land.9 Land use
restrictions that were held “in gross,” rather than in connection with (“appurtenant to”) benefited land, were subject to particular disfavor and generally could not
be transferred by the original grantee or pass by inheritance.10 In addition, only
four types of negative easements, which grant the holder the right to object to a
use of the estate they burden, were traditionally recognized at common law—
those created to protect the flow of air, light, and artificial streams of water, and
to ensure the subjacent and lateral support of buildings or land.11 The foregoing
common law rules raised potential difficulties for the creation and enforcement of
conservation easements because conservation easements do not qualify as one of
the four traditionally-recognized negative easements and they generally consist
of land use restrictions held in gross.12
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, federal and state legislators
came to recognize that restricting the development and other uses of land for conservation or historic preservation purposes can provide significant benefits to the
public.13 In addition, government entities and charitable organizations became
increasingly interested in acquiring conservation easements to accomplish land

9. See, e.g., Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (1982) (“Servitudes [defined as easements, real covenants, and
equitable servitudes] can freeze land uses, thereby distorting patterns of land development and
preventing economically productive uses of land. They can impose burdens that become unreasonable
and depress land values. Additionally, they can impose significant dead hand controls over land
use.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (historically
courts severely constrained the creation of servitudes, reflecting concerns that they would adversely
affect the value of the burdened parcels and perhaps nearby land by limiting or distorting development
of the burdened parcels).
10. See United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Va. 2005); French, supra note 9, at 1268,
1307. An “easement in gross,” sometimes referred to as a personal easement, is not held appurtenant to
an estate in land, but is imposed upon land with the benefit running to an individual or entity. See
Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 446. In contrast, an “easement appurtenant” has both a dominant and a servient
tract and is capable of being transferred or inherited. Id. An easement appurtenant “runs with the land,”
meaning the benefit conveyed by or the duty owed under the easement passes with the ownership of the
land to which it was appurtenant. Id. Although arguing in favor of liberalizing the rules applicable to
land use restrictions held in gross, Professor French noted the traditional reasoning that, with in gross
restrictions, there could be difficulties involved in locating the parties with whom modifications and
releases must be negotiated and the parties seeking enforcement may not have a substantial interest to
protect. See French, supra note 9, at 1307.
11. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 446. The four traditionally-recognized negative easements are, by their
nature, easements appurtenant because their intent is to benefit an adjoining or nearby parcel. Id.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 1.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000). See also
Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 446 (“At common law, an owner of land was not permitted at his pleasure to
create easements of every novel character and annex them to the land so that the land would be burdened
with the easement when the land was conveyed to subsequent grantees. Rather, the landowner was
limited to the creation of easements permitted by the common law or by statute.”).
13. See Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation Easements in
the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J. L. PROP. & SOC’Y 107, 115–
19 (2015) (describing the history of conservation easements in the United States).
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conservation and historic preservation goals.14 Accordingly, to facilitate the use
of conservation easements, all fifty states and the District of Columbia enacted
some form of legislation that removes the common law impediments to their
creation and enforcement (known as the conservation easement “enabling statutes”).15 However, to ensure that conservation easements serve the public interest, the enabling statutes require that conservation easements be (i) created for
conservation, historic preservation, or other purposes that benefit the public, and
(ii) held and enforced by entities that serve the public, generally government
bodies or charitable organizations.16 In addition, some enabling statutes grant the
state attorney general and, in some cases, other government entities the authority
to enforce conservation easements on behalf of the public.17
In sum, state legislatures were willing to remove the common law impediments
to the creation and enforcement of land use restrictions held in gross in the conservation easement context, but only if the easements meet certain requirements
intended to ensure that they will serve the public interest. Traditional servitudes,
14. See id. See also About Us, 38 Years of Conservation Success, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, https://
perma.cc/7LHY-JEZQ (last visited Aug. 13, 2021) (by 1980, more than 400 local and regional land
trusts existed, and the use of conservation easements was growing).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 1.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“The
uncertainty and difficulties imposed by the common law of servitudes led to the widespread enactment
of statutes.”); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public
Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1897, 1900 n.5 (2008) (listing the
statutes).
16. For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, which has been adopted in some form in
just over half the states, requires conservation easements to be created for conservation, historic
preservation, recreational, archeological, or other public-benefiting purposes and limits qualified holders
to government bodies or charitable entities. Uniform Conservation Easement Act § (1)(1), (2) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1981, 2007) [hereinafter UCEA]; UCEA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. A few
enabling statutes include, or appear to include, for-profit entities as qualified holders, but only if their
purposes include conservation. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 121-35(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46; R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3(a). In California and Oregon, certain Native American tribes are qualified holders.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.3(c); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271.715(3)(c).
17. See. e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-19-7(1)(d)–(f) (“Any action to enforce a conservation
easement may be brought by . . . (d) The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi; (e) The
Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3(d) (“The
attorney general, pursuant to his or her inherent authority, may bring an action in the superior court to
enforce the public interest in [conservation easements]”); UCEA, supra note 16, § 3(a)(4) cmt. (“the
state’s other applicable law may create standing in other persons . . . independently of the Act, the
Attorney General could have standing in his capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts”). For
examples of state attorneys general seeking to enforce conservation easements on behalf of the public,
see, e.g., infra note 243 and accompanying text; Brief of Appellee State of Maine, Windham Land Tr.
v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009) (No. CUM-08-434), 2008 WL 6601719; Stipulated Judgment,
Salzburg v. Dowd, No. CV-2008-0079 (Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. Johnson Cty., Wyo., Feb. 17, 2010) (on file
with author); Canyon Vineyard Estates I v. DeJoria, _ Cal. Rptr. 3d _, 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 426 at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022); Amicus Curiae Brief of State Coastal Conservancy, California Coastal
Commission, Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, and Wildlife Conservation Board in Support of
Plaintiff and Respondent Sonoma Land Trust, Sonoma Land Tr. v. Thompson, 2020 WL 7395651
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (unpublished) (No. A157721), 2020 WL 5503894. For a discussion of the
standing provisions in the enabling statutes, see UCEA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 46–50.
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like right-of-way easements agreed to between neighbors, are clearly distinguishable in that they are neither created to benefit the public nor held and enforced by
entities that serve the public. In addition, state attorneys general and other government entities are not typically charged with enforcing traditional servitudes on
behalf of the public.18
B.

HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED BY PUBLIC

The public subsidizes the acquisition of conservation easements to the tune of
billions of dollars annually. These subsidies are provided through numerous tax
incentive and easement purchase programs at the federal, state, and local levels.
Although the collective cost of these programs is unknown, a few examples provide a sense of the magnitude of the public investment.
Since 1980, property owners who make charitable gifts of conservation easements that satisfy certain requirements have been eligible for generous federal
tax deductions.19 A former Treasury Department official determined that, at a
cost in 2016 of between $1.6 to $2.9 billion, this deduction program ranked
among the largest federal environmental and land management programs in the
United States’ budget.20 He explained that we are spending almost as much annually on conservation easements through the deduction program as we spend on
the entire National Park system.21
The public is also investing in conservation easements through various federal
conservation easement purchase programs.22 For example, from 2014 to 2018,
more than $1.75 billion was invested in conservation easements through the

18. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 804 n.61 (explaining that involvement of state attorneys general in the
enforcement of conservation easements “is a strong indication that this is not a good old-fashioned
servitude”).
19. To be eligible for a federal charitable income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation
easement, the requirements set forth in Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation §
1.170A-14 must be satisfied.
20. Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Cost of a Surprising Tax Shelter: The Syndicated
Conservation Easement, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/
12/20/estimating-the-rising-cost-of-a-surprising-tax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservation-easement/ (noting
that, in 2016, the entire budget of the Bureau of Land Management was $1.2 billion, and the entire budget
of the Fish and Wildlife Service was $1.6 billion). See also S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 116TH CONG.,
BIPARTISAN INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON SYNDICATED CONSERVATION-EASEMENT TRANSACTIONS 2–3 (COMM.
PRINT 2020), https://perma.cc/BF3J-WT2T (estimating that, from 2010 through 2017, syndicated donation
transactions alone may have cost taxpayers $10.6 billion in foregone revenue); Roger Colinvaux,
Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 755,
756 (estimating that from 2003 through 2010, individual conservation easement contributions cost
taxpayers in the range of $4.2 billion in foregone revenue).
21. Looney, supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT. RES.
CONSERVATION SERV., https://perma.cc/63EA-S9XT (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); Healthy Forests
Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., https://perma.cc/5MXPTSSD (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); Forest Legacy, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., https://perma.cc/
TT4X-LQZB (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
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U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Conservation Easement
Program. 23
States have likewise been investing in conservation easements. For example, both Colorado and Virginia offer state tax credits to landowners who
donate conservation easements as charitable gifts. 24 In 2017, Colorado
reported having issued more than $1 billion in credits through its program,
and in 2020, Virginia reported having issued $1.8 billion in credits through
its program. 25 States also have conservation easement purchase programs,
such as the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation program,
through which the public had invested over $784 million in easements as of
2020. 26
Localities, too, are investing public funds in conservation easements. For
example, the American Farmland Trust reported that, as of January 2020, at least
ninety-eight local agricultural conservation easement purchase programs were
operating in twenty states, with funds spent to date on the easements totaling over
$2.1 billion.27 Donating or selling a conservation easement can also reduce the
landowner’s local property taxes.28
In sum, the strong public policy favoring conservation easements has
been implemented on a grand scale, as evidenced by the magnitude of the
public investment in conservation easements at the federal, state, and
local levels. This investment is made because conservation easements are
intended to benefit the public. Traditional servitudes, like right-of-way
easements agreed to between neighbors, are again clearly distinguishable in
that they are neither created to benefit nor is their acquisition subsidized by
the public.

23. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION
EASEMENT PROGRAM (ACEP) 8–9 (2021), https://perma.cc/V74E-48KR.
24. See Memorandum from Kate Watkins, Senior Economist, Colo. Legis. Council Staff, to
Interested Persons 2–3 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/J64R-4PTS [hereinafter Colorado Legislative
Council Staff Memorandum]; VA. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION AND RECREATION, CALENDAR YEAR 2019
LAND PRESERVATION TAX CREDIT CONSERVATION VALUE SUMMARY 1 (Dec. 2020) https://perma.cc/
T6VL-BJ9S [hereinafter VA. TAX CREDIT SUMMARY]. As of December 2020, twelve other states
provided tax incentives for donations of conservation easements: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, and South
Carolina. VA. TAX CREDIT SUMMARY, supra, at 1.
25. Colorado Legislative Council Staff Memorandum, supra note 24, at 7; VA. TAX CREDIT
SUMMARY, supra note 24, at 1.
26. MD. AGRIC. LAND PRES. FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT FY20, 1–2, https://perma.cc/8TVX-KDF8
(last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
27. Farmland Information Center, 2020 Status of Local Purchase of Agricultural Conservation
Easement Programs, AM. FARMLAND TRUST 1–6 (Feb. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/Q5PE-BK5Z.
28. See UCEA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 30–33 (explaining that numerous enabling
statutes provide that land subject to a conservation easement must be assessed at its restricted value for
property tax purposes).
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HYBRIDS

Conservation easements are hybrids. Although they are interests in real
property, they also generally are created under the auspices of a state enabling statute, they often are conveyed in whole or in part as charitable gifts,
and they typically are structured to comply with the rules governing taxincentive or easement purchase programs. 29 Given the hybrid nature of conservation easements, a number of different bodies of law may be relevant to
their enforcement, including the state enabling statutes, contract law, charitable gift law, federal tax law, and the rules governing conservation easement purchase programs.30 A brief description of these various bodies of
law and their relevance may help to reduce the confusion that stems, in large
part, from use of the “conservation easement” moniker for a hybrid interest
that is, for many purposes, an easement in name only.31
One body of law potentially relevant to the enforcement of conservation easements is the state enabling statutes.32 However, the enabling statutes generally
were enacted for the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away certain common law impediments that might otherwise undermine the validity of conservation easements, particularly conservation easements held in gross.33 Accordingly,
although the enabling statutes may contain provisions relevant to a particular
enforcement issue, they are not comprehensive and leave many questions unanswered. For example, while some enabling statutes confirm that a conservation
easement may not be extinguished pursuant to the doctrine of merger, others are
silent regarding the issue.34
Another potentially relevant body of law is that applicable to traditional servitudes. Conservation easements are nonpossessory interests in real property that
restrict the use of the property they encumber.35 However, as explained above,
conservation easements do not fit neatly within any of the traditional servitude
categories, and enactment of the enabling statutes was necessary to ensure their
validity under state law.36 In addition, also as explained above, conservation

29. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 6, at 795 (“Properly understood, conservation easements . . . are in fact
hybrids that contain elements of servitude, future interest, taxation, and charitable trust law”).
30. See also Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 111–15 (describing the various types of
conservation easements that can be created and the “mosaic of laws” that may affect them).
31. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 800.
32. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the enabling statutes.
33. See UCEA, supra note 16, Prefatory Note at 2.
34. See UCEA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 28-29. See also Part II.C, discussing the
merger doctrine.
35. See UCEA, supra note 16, § 1(1). Conservation easements may also impose affirmative
obligations. Id. For example, the donor of a facade easement that encumbers a historic structure may
agree to restore the facade to its original state, or the holder of the easement may agree to undertake the
restoration. Id. § 4(5) cmt.
36. See supra Part I.A.
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easements are created to benefit the public and are heavily subsidized by the public, which are not characteristics of traditional servitudes.37
Because of their peculiar nature, applying traditional servitudes law to conservation easements will often be contrary to the public interest, as was recognized
by the courts in the cases discussed in Part II. Professor Wolf, general editor of a
multi-volume treatise on real property law, explained: “The public interest, which
is inextricably connected with these special legislative hybrids, demands a much
more flexible set of legal and equitable remedies than is normally available under
the traditional easement regime.”38
Professor Wolf attributes the tendency of courts to apply traditional servitudes
law to conservation easements to the “nomenclature problem,” namely the widespread use of the term “easement” to refer to these hybrid interests.39 He pointed
out the “needless confusion resulting from using the same word to describe distinct concepts”— the statutory hybrids called conservation easements and the
traditional or, in his words, “real” easements.40 He noted that litigators would
not (and, in the name of zealous advocacy, perhaps should not) hesitate to take
advantage of favorable easement doctrines that are not directly addressed in
the relevant enabling statutes in an attempt to prevail in their disputes.41
Unsurprisingly, landowners used this litigation tactic in the conservation easement enforcement cases discussed in Part II. Professor Wolf also noted that “it
is probably asking too much of the members of our over-burdened judiciary
(many of whom are decades away from their initial introduction to servitudes
law) to perceive the outcome-determinative difference between a ‘real’ easement and the statutory hybrid bearing the same name.”42 As the cases discussed
in Part II illustrate, however, some judges have perceived this difference.
Another body of law potentially relevant to conservation easement enforcement disputes is contract law. Conservation easements are generally created by
deed, and deeds are generally construed in the same manner as contracts.43

37. See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
38. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 804. See also POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Michael Allan Wolf ed.
2013). Professor Wolf also warned that problematic emerging case law in the conservation easement
context may one day come back to haunt and infect “real” easement law. See Wolf, supra note 6, at
806–08.
39. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 788, 795–98, 802–08.
40. Id. at 800, 806.
41. Id. at 800.
42. Id. Professor Wolf recommended that we abandon the term “conservation easement” in favor of
the term used in the Treasury Regulations interpreting the federal deduction provision for conservation
easement donations—“perpetual conservation restriction.” See id. at 801, 808–10. He said this term has
three major advantages: it is “a (1) descriptively accurate, (2) functional definition that (3) carries none
of the potentially confusing and problematic common-law baggage of terms such as ‘conservation
easements,’ ‘conservation servitudes,’ and the like.” Id. at 802.
43. See Thomas S. Barrett, Model Easement Conservation and Commentary, in THE CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK: MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT
PROGRAMs 156–63 (Janet Diehl & Thomas S. Barrett eds., 1988) [hereinafter 1988 CONSERVATION
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Accordingly, contract law may be relevant when interpreting conservation easements.44 Under contract law principles, for example, the court’s goal is to determine the parties’ intent by closely reading the contract and interpreting its
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning; the court will avoid interpreting provisions in a way that makes the other provisions inconsistent or meaningless; and the contract as a whole will be considered, taking into consideration
the relationship among the various parts.45
Another potentially relevant body of law is that governing charitable gifts. In
many cases, conservation easements are donated as charitable gifts by property
owners with deep affection for their land and a desire to ensure that it will be permanently protected from uses that could harm its conservation or historic values.46 In such cases, a “well recognized rule, uniformly followed by all courts”
should apply: “that gifts to charitable uses and purposes are highly favored in
law, and will be most liberally construed to make effectual the intended purpose
of the donor.”47 The similarly well-recognized rules that charitable gifts must be
EASEMENT HANDBOOK] (providing a model “Deed of Conservation Easement”); Miller v. Kirkpatrick,
833 A.2d 536, 545 (Md. 2003) (in a case involving a right-of-way easement between neighbors, the
court explained: “In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation
apply”).
44. See, e.g., Four B Props., LLC v. Nature Conservancy, 458 P.3d 832, 841 (Wyo. 2020) (applying
contract principles to the interpretation of a conservation easement); Lyme Land Conservation Tr., Inc.
v. Platner, 159 A.3d 666, 674 (Conn. 2017) (in finding that the terms of a conservation easement had
been violated, the court explained: “[C]ontractual terms are to be given their ordinary meaning and
when the intention conveyed is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.” (citation
omitted)). However, in Fettig v. Estate of Fettig, 934 N.W.2d 547, 552 (N.D. 2019), which involved a
gift of fee title, the court explained that deeds are contracts and are generally construed in the same
manner as contracts, but when a voluntary transfer is intended as a gift, the rules of law concerning gifts,
not contracts, apply. On the relationship between contract law and charitable gift law, see, e.g., William
P. Sullivan, The Restricted Charitable Gift as Third-Party-Beneficiary Contract, 52 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 79 (2017).
45. See Four B Props., 458 P.3d at 841. See also Chatham Conservation Found., Inc. v. Farber,
779 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Mass. Ct. App. 2002) (“A [conservation] restriction, like a deed, ‘is to be
construed so as to give effect to the intent of the parties as manifested by the words used,
interpreted in the light of the material circumstances and pertinent facts known to them at the time
it was executed’ and “the restriction ‘must be construed beneficially, according to the apparent
purpose of protection or advantage . . . it was intended to secure or promote.’”).
46. See, e.g., Green Lake Conservancy Announces Major Conservation Easement, RIPON PRESS
(May 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/975A-2WAN (“Under a CE, the landowner essentially says, ‘I am
entering into this agreement to ensure the land I love will never be developed’”); 2005 CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 7 (“For the many people who love their land, [a conservation
easement] is the best way to ensure that it will be preserved for all time,” quoting Rand Wentworth,
former Land Trust Alliance President); Christopher West Davis, Pushing the Sprawl Back: Landowners
Turn to Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, https://perma.cc/HUN9-7A6Y (“Stephen J. Small, a lawyer
who wrote the federal income tax regulations on conservation easements . . . summed it up: ‘Most
people who donate conservation easements do so for three reasons: they love their land; they love their
land; they love their land’”).
47. In re Coe Coll. for Interpretation of Purported Gift Restriction, 935 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 2019). See
also, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill v. Unknown and Unascertained Heirs, 319 S.E.2d
239, 242 (N.C. 1984) (“It is a well recognized principle that gifts . . . for charities are highly favored by
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used for the purposes for which they were given and are enforceable by the state
attorney general and the courts on behalf of the public should also apply.48
Notably, the drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (“UCEA”) specifically contemplated that the case and statutory law governing charitable gifts
would apply to conservation easements conveyed as such.49 Professor Wolf cautioned, however, that:
[c]ourts distracted by the common-law rules normally applicable to servitudes
might . . . fail to recognize the fiduciary obligations requiring government and
nonprofit holders to administer these ‘easements’ consistent with their stated
terms and charitable conservation purposes on behalf of donors, funders, and
the public, as well as the authority of certain state attorneys general to bring
suit against a holder who fails to meet these obligations.50

This discussion is intended to minimize that distraction.
Yet another potentially relevant body of law is federal or state tax law. For
example, as noted above, since 1980, property owners who make charitable gifts

the courts. Thus, the donor’s intentions are effectuated by the most liberal rules of construction
permitted.”); Richards v. Wilson, 112 N.E. 780, 795 (Ind. 1916) (“[i]f the words of a gift are ambiguous
or contradictory, they are . . . construed . . . to support the charity if possible.”).
48. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997 (Conn. 1997) (equity
affords protection to a donor to a charitable corporation in that the attorney general may maintain a suit
to compel the property to be held for the charitable purpose for which it was given); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW, CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.02 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2021) (cy
pres should not apply to extinguish a conservation easement where it has not become illegal, impossible,
impracticable, or wasteful to continue to carry out the charitable purpose of the donor). On attorney
general enforcement of conservation easements, see supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text;
Lyme Land Conservation Tr., Inc. v. Planter, No. CV096001607, 2013 WL 3625348, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 29, 2013) (noting the attorney general’s statutory authority to bring a court action to
enforce the public’s interest in a conservation easement is analogous to his codified common-law
authority “to represent the public interest in the protection of any gifts, legacies or devises intended for
public or charitable purposes.”). See also Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *6 (holding that
the deductible conservation easements at issue constituted restricted charitable gifts, or “contributions
conditioned on the use of a gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and limitations”
(citation omitted)).
49. The commentary to the UCEA states that the “Act leaves intact the existing case and statute law
of adopting states as it relates to the enforcement of charitable trusts.” UCEA, supra note 16, Prefatory
Note at 3. The reference to charitable trusts was due to the vintage of the UCEA, which was adopted in
1981. At that time, it was common for courts to refer to charitable gifts made for specified purposes,
whether made in trust or nontrust form, as “charitable trusts.” See, e.g., State v. Rand, 366 A.2d. 183
(Me. 1976) (gift of land to a city to be forever maintained as a public park created a charitable trust). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“A disposition to [a
charitable] institution for a specific purpose . . . creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the
trustee”). The UCEA drafters did not intend to draw a distinction between charitable gifts of
conservation easements made in trust versus nontrust form. See K. King Burnett, The Uniform
Conservation Easement Act: Reflections of a Member of the Drafting Committee, 3 UTAH L. REV. 773,
777, 780, 781 (2013) (references to charitable trust in the UCEA intended to encompass charitable
gifts); Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc, 699 A.2d at 997–98, n.2 (“The law governing the enforcement of
charitable gifts is derived from the law of charitable trusts” (citations omitted)).
50. Wolf, supra note 6, at 804.
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of conservation easements have been eligible for generous federal deductions
provided the easements satisfy certain federal tax law requirements.51 The terms
that must be included in conservation easement deeds to comply with these
requirements are intended to ensure that the easements will provide benefits to
the public sufficient to justify the public investment.52 Such terms are also
intended to protect the public investment in conservation in the unlikely event
that a court extinguishes a conservation easement for which a deduction was
claimed.53 Although a detailed discussion of the federal tax law requirements for
donated easements is beyond the scope of this Article, a few examples will illustrate their relevance to conservation easement enforcement cases.
To be eligible for a federal deduction for the donation of a conservation easement, the conservation purpose of the charitable contribution must be “protected
in perpetuity.”54 This requirement means, among other things, that the conservation easement must (i) prohibit uses that are inconsistent with the conservation
purposes of the donation; (ii) prohibit uses that could injure or destroy the property’s specific conservation interests, with one limited exception; (iii) be extinguishable only in a judicial proceeding upon a finding by the court that continued
use of the property for conservation purposes has become impossible or impractical; and (iv) provide that, following judicial extinguishment, the donee is entitled
to a specified share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale or exchange of the
property and must use those proceeds in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.55 Applying the common law principle
that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of free use of property to
a deductible easement could run counter to the federal tax law mandates in (i) and

51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. For examples of state conservation easement taxincentive programs, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52. See S. REP. NO. 96-1007 (1980), 1980 WL 12915, *8–16 [hereinafter 1980 SENATE REPORT].
53. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
54. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e), (g)(1), (g)(6); Belk v. Comm’r, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014). See
also 1980 SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at *13–14 (explaining the “protected in perpetuity”
requirement). In Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the Tax Court and held that the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), regarding calculation of the proceeds due the holder on
extinguishment, was arbitrary and capricious and violated the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). However, in Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commissioner, 28 F.4th
700 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth Circuit found the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning unpersuasive and held that
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), as interpreted by the Commissioner and the Fifth Circuit in
PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018), is both procedurally valid under
the APA and substantively valid under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Given the split in the circuits, the validity of the regulation under the APA may be
appealed to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Tax Court is required to follow Hewitt only in the
11th Circuit, which has jurisdiction over federal cases originating in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See
Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971) (holding that the Tax Court is required to follow a circuit court decision that is squarely on point
only where an appeal lies to that court).
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(ii) above. Similarly, extinguishing deductible conservation easements under the
doctrine of merger would permit the parties to circumvent the strict limits that
federal tax law places on their extinguishment.56 Accordingly, courts faced with
enforcement cases involving deductible conservation easements should be mindful of the content and purpose of the federal tax law requirements that shaped the
easements’ terms.
The rules governing federal, state, and local conservation easement purchase
programs are still another potentially relevant set of laws.57 The legislation establishing conservation easement purchase programs may include requirements relevant to the enforcement of the easements. For example, in 1990, Congress
established the Forest Legacy Program.58 Under this program, federal grants are
provided to state agencies for the acquisition of permanent conservation easements that are held by the state or local units of government.59
The Forest Legacy Program was established for the following purposes:
“ascertaining and protecting environmentally important forest areas that are
threatened by conversion to nonforest uses,” “promoting forest land protection
and other conservation opportunities,” and “the protection of important scenic,
cultural, fish, wildlife, and recreational resources, riparian areas, and other ecological values.”60 The legislation establishing the program also provides, among
other things, that, “[n]otwithstanding any provision of State law, conservation
easements shall be construed to effect the Federal purposes for which they were
acquired and, in interpreting their terms, there shall be no presumption favoring the conservation easement holder or fee owner.”61 Thus conservation easements acquired with Forest Legacy Program funds must be construed to carry
out the federal conservation purposes for which they were acquired and not, for
example, in favor of the free use of property under state law applicable to restrictive covenants. Accordingly, courts faced with enforcement cases involving conservation easements acquired with funding from an easement purchase
program must be mindful of the rules governing that program. There also may
be more than one relevant body of law, as conservation easements acquired
under purchase programs are sometimes donated in part as charitable gifts, the
property owners sometimes receive federal tax benefits for the gift component,

56. See infra notes 210–214 and accompanying text, discussing this issue.
57. For examples of federal, state, and local easement purchase programs, see notes 22, 26, and 27
and accompanying text.
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDELINES 7 (May 2017) [hereinafter FLP IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES], https://www.fs.usda.gov/
sites/default/files/fs_media/fs_document/15541-forest-service-legacy-program-508.pdf.
59. FLP IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 58, at 5, 10. The Forest Legacy Program is funded
through the Land and Water Conservation Funds, which are generated through royalties from offshore
drilling activities. Id. at 10.
60. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(a).
61. Id. § 2103c(k)(3).
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and the easements are also generally created under the auspices of a state enabling statute.62
In sum, applying traditional servitudes law to conservation easements is problematic because conservation easements are statutory hybrids created to benefit
the public and not “real” easements. Because of their hybrid nature, various laws
may be implicated in the enforcement of conservation easements, including state
enabling statutes, contract law, charitable gift law, tax law, and the laws governing conservation easement purchase programs. Traditional servitudes, like rightof-way easements between neighbors, are clearly distinguishable; they are the
“real” easements to which traditional servitude principles were developed to
apply. They also are not created under the auspices of state enabling statutes, they
are not donated as charitable gifts, their grantors do not comply with tax law
requirements designed to protect the public interest, and their acquisition is not
subsidized through publicly-funded purchase programs, the rules of which are
designed to protect the public interest.
II. CASES RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL STATUS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
This Part brings together the handful of enforcement cases in which the courts
expressly recognized the special status of conservation easements. In one case, it
was the dissenting judges who did so, but their position was later validated by the
state legislature. Although the cases discussed in this Part address different
enforcement issues, there is a through line: conservation easements are created to
benefit the public and carry out legislatively stated public purposes, and it is contrary to the public interest to blindly apply to them principles developed to facilitate the marketability and development of land or to resolve disputes between
private parties.63
The goal of bringing these cases together and identifying the through line is to
catalyze courts to take a more consistent and appropriate approach in future conservation easement enforcement cases—one that expressly recognizes and is
informed by the special status of conservation easements. The discussion of these
cases also illustrates what is at stake in the conservation easement enforcement
context. Nonprofit and government holders already face significant challenges in
enforcing conservation easements on behalf of the public. Failing to acknowledge
the special status of conservation easements would, among other things, create
62. See FLP IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 58, at 13 (noting that Forest Legacy Program
projects for which the landowner expects to receive tax benefits are subject to complex tax requirements
that must be met in addition to the Forest Legacy Program requirements). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW, CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 4.02 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2021) (a specific
restriction on a charitable asset can be created whether the asset is donated in full or is conveyed in a part
sale, part gift transaction, sometimes referred to as a “bargain sale”).
63. The American Law Institute has also recognized the special status of conservation easements.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1.6, 3.1 cmt. f, illus. 4, 7.11, 7.16(5), 8.5
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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powerful incentives for landowners to challenge or violate conservation easements and equally powerful disincentives for holders to seek to enforce the
easements. The result would be the loss over time of many of the promised
conservation benefits and much of the public investment in conservation
easements.
A.

OLD COMMON LAW RULES BARRING IN-GROSS EASEMENTS

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was one of the first courts
to recognize the special status of conservation easements. In 1991, the court
in Bennett v. Commissioner of Food and Agriculture held that a restriction
on development in a conservation easement was valid and enforceable even
though the restriction was held in gross and was not expressly validated by
the State’s conservation easement enabling statute. 64 The court explained:
“[w]here the beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restriction
reinforces a legislatively stated public purpose, old common law rules barring the creation and enforcement of easements in gross have no continuing
force.” 65
Bennett involved enforcement of a perpetual agricultural preservation
restriction (“APR”), a type of conservation easement the Massachusetts enabling statute authorizes to preserve farmland. 66 The Bennetts’ predecessors had granted the APR to the State, acting through its Commissioner of
Food and Agriculture (the “Commissioner”), for $291,000.67 The APR
encumbered 250 acres of farmland and reserved to the owner of the land the
right to construct one or more dwelling units, subject to the approval of the
Commissioner. 68
Soon after the Bennetts purchased the land subject to the APR, they applied
to the Commissioner for approval to build a farmhouse on the land.69 The site
they chose was on a hilltop and would have required a 3,000-foot driveway.70
The Commissioner declined to grant approval, finding that building in the
requested location would cause soil erosion, eliminate two acres of prime farmland through construction of the driveway, and raise the fair market value of
the land by changing its nature from a farm to an estate.71 The Commissioner
concluded that constructing a home on the hilltop would undermine the APR’s
purpose, which was to preserve the land for future farmers.72
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991).
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1365 (referencing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31).
Id.
Id. at 1365–66.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1365–66.
Id. at 1366.
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Although the Commissioner suggested five alternative sites for the farmhouse,
the Bennetts rejected all five and filed suit.73 The Bennetts argued that the restriction requiring Commissioner approval of the location of the farmhouse did not
fall within the enabling statute’s definition of an APR. They further argued that,
as successors to the parties who granted the APR, they were not bound by the approval restriction under the common law because there was no privity of estate or
contract between them and the Commissioner and the Commissioner held the
restriction in gross.74 The Bennetts acknowledged that the Massachusetts enabling statute provides that an APR is not rendered unenforceable on account of
lack of privity of estate or contract or lack of benefit to particular land.75
However, they argued that the Commissioner could not rely on that language
because it applied only to restrictions that fell within the definition of an APR in
the statute.76
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sided with the Commissioner,
holding that, even if the approval restriction did not fall within the definition of
an APR under the enabling statute, it was nonetheless enforceable.77 Because the
beneficiary of the restriction was the public and the restriction reinforced a legislatively stated public purpose (protection of farmland), the court deemed the “old
common law rules barring the creation and enforcement of easements in gross” to
be inapplicable.78 Instead, the appropriate question to ask was whether enforcement of the bargain struck in the APR between the Bennetts’ predecessors and
the Commissioner was consistent with public policy and reasonable.79
The court found that the approval restriction in the APR was consistent with
public policy and reasonable, and that there was no reason why it should not be
enforced.80 In support of its holding, the court explained that, unlike with some
easements held in gross, the person who had the right to enforce the restriction—
the Commissioner—was clearly identified; the restriction was consistent with
and, indeed, strengthened the public policy expressed in the enabling statute; public funds had been expended for the APR; and the Bennetts had acquired title to
the farmland with notice of the terms of the APR.81 Although not expressly mentioned by the court, the Bennetts also likely paid a reduced purchase price for the
farmland due to the APR’s perpetual restrictions. In conclusion, the court noted
that, while it was not endorsing the enforcement of all easements held in gross,
“certain common law rules concerning the creation, validity, and enforcement of

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1368.
Id.
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servitudes may no longer be sound” and it was “willing to reconsider them in
appropriate cases.”82
Fourteen years after Bennett, another state supreme court was confronted with
a similar case. In United States v. Blackman, the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the validity of a conservation easement in gross that had been granted to a
nonprofit organization in 1973 to protect farmland and a historic manor house.83
Blackman, who purchased the subject property in 2005 and proceeded to violate
the easement, argued that the easement was invalid because Virginia did not
enact a statute authorizing the conveyance of conservation easements in gross to
nonprofits until 1988.84 Blackman asserted that enactment of the 1988 enabling
statute would have been unnecessary if such easements were already valid.85
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. The court first acknowledged that
“[a]t common law, an owner of land was not permitted at his pleasure to create
easements of every novel character and annex them to the land so that the land
would be burdened with the easement when the land was conveyed to subsequent
grantees.”86 Rather, landowners were limited to the creation of easements permitted by the common law or by statute.87 The court also acknowledged that, at common law, easements in gross were strongly disfavored because they were viewed
as interfering with the free use of land.88
However, Virginia had enacted a statute in 1849 that abrogated common law
restrictions on the transfer of interests in land by declaring that “any interest in or
claim to real estate may be disposed of by deed or will.”89 Although this statute
had been amended in 1962 to clarify that easements in gross fell within its purview and, at the time of the Blackman case, it had been applied to an affirmative
easement in gross, there was still some question as to whether it applied to negative easements in gross.90 In addition, the court stated that it “continue[d] to be of
opinion that ‘the law will not permit a land-owner to create easements of every
novel character and attach them to the soil.’”91 Nonetheless, the court interpreted
the 1849 statute, as amended, to apply to negative easements in gross created for
conservation or historic preservation purposes, thus validating the easement at
issue in Blackman.92

82. Id. at 1368 n.4.
83. 613 S.E.2d 442 (Va. 2005). The easement was later transferred to the United States to be
administered by the National Park Service as part of a National Historic Landmark District. Id. at 444.
84. Id. at 444–45.
85. Id. at 448.
86. Id. at 446.
87. Id. For the four traditionally-recognized negative easements, see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
88. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d at 446.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 448.
92. Id. at 447–49.
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In support of its holding, the court referenced Virginia’s strong public policy in
favor of conservation and historic preservation, as evidenced by the legislature’s
enactment of statutes in the 1960s authorizing the conveyance of conservation
easements in gross to public bodies; Virginia’s Constitution, which since 1970
has expressly stated that it is the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve its natural resources and historic sites and buildings; and the Governor’s encouragement of the granting of conservation easements in the historic district in which
the easement at issue had been granted.93 The court also held that the 1988 statute
authorizing the conveyance of conservation easements in gross to nonprofits did
not create a new right.94 Rather, it merely codified and consolidated the law of
conservation easements to promote the granting of such easements to charitable
organizations.95 The court also found compelling that conservation easements in
gross conveyed to charitable organizations had been in common use in the
Commonwealth before 1988 (they were not “of a novel character”), and a contrary holding would have had a detrimental effect on thousands of acres and
numerous historic sites protected by such easements.96
Faced with a degree of apparent conflict between, on the one hand, the common law preference for unrestricted rights of ownership of real property and, on
the other hand, the public policy of the Commonwealth to conserve its natural
resources and historic sites, the court in Blackman, similar to the court in Bennett,
chose to support the latter.97 Both courts implicitly recognized that applying old
common law rules designed to facilitate the marketability and development of
land to conservation easements, the very purpose of which is to constrain development to provide benefits to the public, would be nonsensical and contrary to
public policy. In other words, both courts acknowledged and found persuasive
the special status of conservation easements as assets created and held for the
benefit of the public and supported by strong public policy.
B.

LACHES AND ESTOPPEL

When terms of a conservation easement are violated and the government or
nonprofit holder files an enforcement action, the landowner will often seek to bar
the action by asserting the equitable defenses of laches or estoppel. Laches bars
relief to a party whose unreasonable delay in bringing an action prejudices the
other party’s rights.98 Estoppel protects a party who relies to his detriment on
another’s conduct.99

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 447, 449.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 445 n.*, 448–49.
Id. at 445.
See, e.g., Hayes v. State Teacher Certification Bd., 835 N.E.2d 146, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
See, e.g., United States v. 18.16 Acres of Land, 598 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
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In two notable cases, courts declined to apply laches or estoppel to bar the
holder from enforcing a conservation easement because of the special status of
conservation easements.100 In each case, the court explicitly acknowledged that
such enforcement actions involve the safeguarding of important public interests.
These cases are consistent with the general reluctance of courts to bar actions
brought by government or nonprofit entities in other contexts when those entities
are safeguarding important public interests. Before turning to the two conservation easement enforcement cases, a brief discussion of the reasoning underlying
the courts’ general reluctance to bar enforcement actions when public interests
are at stake is in order.
1. Background
As a general rule, the defenses of laches and estoppel can be successfully
asserted against government entities only in extraordinary circumstances. The
Supreme Court articulated the basic reasons for this general rule in United States
v. California, in which it held that laches and estoppel did not bar the federal government from enforcing its rights in the lands, minerals, and other things of value
underlying the three-mile ocean belt immediately adjacent to the California
coast.101 California argued that the federal government had lost those rights
because of the conduct of its agents, who had engaged in transactions indicating
their belief that California owned all or at least part of the three-mile belt.102 In
holding for the federal government, the Supreme Court explained:
even assuming that Government agencies have been negligent in failing to recognize or assert the claims of the Government . . ., the great interests of the
Government . . . are not to be forfeited as a result. The Government, which
holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be
deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for
private disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and officers who
have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence,
laches, or failure to act.103

100. See infra Part II.B.2.
101. 332 U.S. 19, 22–23, 39–40 (1947).
102. Id. at 23–24, 39–40.
103. Id. at 39–40. See also, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917)
(“As a general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the government is no defense to a
suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest”); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of
Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (“When the Government is unable to enforce the law
because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in
obedience to the rule of law is undermined.”); Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422
(1990) (“courts of appeals have taken our statements as an invitation to search for an appropriate case in
which to apply estoppel against the Government, yet we have reversed every finding of estoppel that we
have reviewed.”).

188

THE GEORGETOWN ENV’T LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:167

For similar reasons, courts are reluctant to permit laches or estoppel to bar the
claims of states or subordinate government entities, such as municipalities, when
such entities are safeguarding important public interests.104 In a few cases, this reluctance has even been extended to private parties seeking to protect the public
interest.105
Courts also have been reluctant to permit laches or estoppel to bar the claims
of nonprofits when they sue private corporations for alleged violations of federal
environmental protection laws.106 In these cases, courts have noted the magnitude
and importance of the public rights at stake; that public rights should not be compromised or forfeited by the negligence of those who act, not for themselves, but
104. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Bd. of Registration In Med., 837 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Mass. 2005) (“‘[l]aches is
not generally a bar where a public right is being enforced.’”); Del Gallo v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 816
N.E.2d 108, 111 (Mass. 2004) (“‘Estoppel is not applied to government acts where to do so would
frustrate a policy intended to protect the public interest.’”); Byrd v. Pierce Cty., 425 P.3d 948, 953
(Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (“estoppel against state or local governments is disfavored”); Clary v. City of
Crescent City, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“Estoppel against the government may
be applied ‘only in the most extraordinary case where the injustice is great and the precedent set by the
estoppel is narrow’”); Lamar Co. v. City of Columbia, 512 S.W.3d 774, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“as to
municipalities [the doctrine of equitable estoppel] is applied cautiously because of the public interest
involved.”); Iles v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (“Equitable estoppel
cannot be invoked against a governmental entity, except in unique circumstances where the court finds
exceptional and extraordinary equities involved.”); Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. D.C.
Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 1036, 1049 (D.C. App. Ct. 2008) (“laches and estoppel are
to be narrowly applied against the government”); Grella v. Hevesi, 827 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007) (estoppel “generally cannot be invoked against the state or its agencies”); Hayes v. State
Teacher Certification Bd., 835 N.E.2d 146, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“unless extraordinary circumstances are
present, the doctrine [of laches] is applied sparingly to public bodies”).
105. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697 (R.I. 1993) (laches did not bar a suit by
private landowners to compel the town to repair a public right-of-way despite the landowners’
longstanding inaction); Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 94 A.2d 332 (N.J. 1953) (property owner’s suit to
enjoin violation of a zoning ordinance served not only the owner’s private interests but also those of the
entire community and, in such circumstances, the equitable doctrine of laches should be hesitatingly
invoked); George v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 322 P.2d 369, 372 (Ariz. 1958) (claim by for-profit entities
challenging a certificate issued by state corporation commission was not barred by laches; “where the
public interest is involved neither estoppel nor laches can be permitted to override that interest”).
106. See, e.g., U.S. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Atl. Salmon of Me., LLC., 215 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D. Me.
2002) (environmental group’s suit against offshore salmon farm operator for alleged violations of Clean
Water Act not barred by laches or estoppel); Me. People’s All. v. Holtrachem Mfg. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 21035 (D. Me. 2001), aff’d 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7846 (nonprofit suit against chemical company
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act not barred by laches); Conn. Fund for the Env’t v.
Upjohn, 660 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1987) (nonprofits’ suit against chemical corporation for alleged
violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act not barred by laches or estoppel); Student Pub. Int.
Rsch. Grp. of N.J. v. P.D. Oil & Chem. Storage, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D. N.J. 1986) (nonprofits’ suit
against chemical corporation for alleged violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act not barred
by laches or estoppel); Grand Canyon Tr. v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 391 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004)
(assumed, without deciding, that laches is available as a defense against a private attorney general suing
under the Clean Air Act but it “must be applied ‘sparingly’”). See also Lake Michigan Fed’n v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 448 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (suit by nonprofit to prevent extension of
university campus into Lake Michigan on public trust grounds not barred by laches; “courts are
extremely reluctant to apply the doctrine of laches when, as in this case, a plaintiff is attempting to
safeguard an important public interest”).
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only as guardians of the public; and that laches and estoppel ought not to be used
to undercut congressionally-fashioned environmental policy.107 Laches and estoppel are also disfavored in these cases because the nonprofit plaintiff is not the
only victim of the alleged environmental harm, and it stands in the shoes of the
government in attempting to safeguard important public interests.108
2. Conservation Easement Enforcement Cases
The strong bias against barring the enforcement of public rights on laches or
estoppel grounds is also reflected in conservation easement enforcement cases. In
some conservation easement enforcement cases, the courts have analyzed only
the traditional elements of laches or estoppel in determining that the government
or nonprofit holder was not barred from enforcing the easement.109 In other cases,
however, the courts expressly acknowledged that the government or nonprofit
holder was enforcing public rights or protecting the public interest and, thus, was
entitled to special deference.110 Two cases in the latter category are discussed
107. See, e.g., Me. People’s All., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21035, at *7; Conn. Fund for the Env’t, 660 F.
Supp. at 1414; Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of N.J., 627 F. Supp. at 1085.
108. See, e.g., Me. People’s All., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21035, at *7; U.S. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 215 F.
Supp. 2d at 258–59; Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of N.J., 627 F. Supp. at 1085. See also Park Cty Res.
Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 617 (10th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by,
Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Nearly every
circuit, including this one, and numerous district courts have recognized the salutary principle that
‘[l]aches must be invoked sparingly in environmental cases because ordinarily the plaintiff will not be
the only victim of alleged environmental damage.’”) (quoting Pres. Coal., Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851,
854 (9th Cir. 1982)). For a rare case in which a court applied laches against a government entity but did
so to protect the public interest in land that served as an integral component of a wildlife sanctuary, see
Stenehjem ex rel. State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 844 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 2014).
109. See Windham Land Tr. v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009) (estoppel did not bar land trust
enforcement of conservation easement); Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. v. Mullen, 886 A.2d 900 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2005) (estoppel did not bar state agencies’ enforcement of conservation easement). For
similar unreported and trial court decisions, see N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 2010 WL 173533
(N.J. Sup. App. Div. 2010) (unpublished), aff’d as modified, 63 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2013) (laches and
estoppel did not bar state agency enforcement of conservation easement); Sonoma Land Tr. v.
Thompson, No. SCV-258010 (Super. Ct. Cal., Cty. of Sonoma, Apr. 16, 2019) (estoppel did not bar land
trust enforcement of conservation easement).
110. See Feduniak v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (estoppel did
not bar state agency enforcement of a conservation easement); Weston Forest and Trail Ass’n, Inc. v
Fishman, 849 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (laches and estoppel inapplicable to land trust
enforcing conservation easement). For similar unreported and trial court decisions involving
government holders, see Cty. of Orange v. Chen, 2011 WL 3806565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished)
(estoppel did not bar county enforcement of conservation easement); Town of Milton v. Johnson, No.
219-2015-CV-00178 (N.H. Super. Ct. Strafford Cty. April 7, 2017) (laches and estoppel did not bar
town enforcement of conservation easement). For a case in which the court found estoppel did not bar
the U.S. government’s enforcement of a conservation easement, see United States v. Schoenborn, 860
F.2d 1448 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that it is well settled that the government may not be estopped on the
same terms as any other litigant). In a similar case, United States v. Jackson, No. CV 05–214–C–LMB,
2007 WL 1169695, at *9 (D. Idaho 2007), which settled, the court explained: “‘The person seeking
estoppel against the government . . . must show that the potential injustice to him outweighs the
possibility of damage to the public interest.’” See also Boston Redev. Auth. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 125 F.
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below: Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission and Weston Forest and Trail
Association, Inc. v. Fishman.111 These two cases illustrate that, because of the importance of the public interests involved in conservation easement enforcement
cases, laches and estoppel either should not apply or should apply only in the
most extraordinary of circumstances, and this special deference should be
accorded to both government and nonprofit holders.
a. Feduniak
In Feduniak, a California appellate court held that neither estoppel nor laches
barred the California Coastal Commission (the “Commission”) from ordering
coastal homeowners to comply with the terms of a conservation easement by
removing their private three-hole pitch-and-putt golf course from around their
house and restoring the area to its native sand dune vegetation.112 Previous owners of the land had granted the conservation easement to a local nonprofit organization in exchange for a permit from the Commission that allowed them to
construct a new residence on the property.113
This case is particularly noteworthy because the court refused to apply estoppel
or laches even though the homeowners—Mr. and Mrs. Feduniak—presented a
sympathetic case. The Feduniaks had purchased the property, located on 17 Mile
Drive in Pebble Beach, California, from the easement grantors for $13 million
specifically because they liked the unique golf course landscaping.114 The
Feduniaks also had no notice of the conservation easement at the time of the purchase because the sellers failed to mention it in their real estate disclosure statement and, even though the easement had been properly recorded, the title
company failed to disclose it in its title report.115 In addition, the Commission had
failed to either inspect the property or enforce the easement for eighteen years.116
The court nonetheless refused to apply either estoppel or laches to bar the
Commission from enforcing the easement, emphasizing the challenges associated
with enforcing conservation easements and other permit conditions, as well as the
public’s vital interest in the preservation of the scenic and natural resources of the
California coast.

Supp. 3d 325 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d 838 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2016) (declining to apply judicial estoppel to
preclude the National Park Service from enforcing a land use restriction held for public benefit despite
the Service’s negligence); Cty. of Humboldt v. McKee, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(estoppel did not bar county’s enforcement of Williamson Act contract restrictions because it was not an
extraordinary case where injustice to the landowner would justify the negative effect on the public
interest).
111. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591; Weston Forest, 849 N.E.2d 916.
112. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 594.
113. Id. at 594–96.
114. Id. at 597.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 615.
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While the court acknowledged that the government is not immune from the
doctrine of estoppel, it explained that estoppel applies to bar a government’s
enforcement action in the land use context only in “extraordinary” cases.117 To
estop the government, the elements necessary to estop a private party must be
present, and two additional findings must be made: (i) estopping the government
must not nullify a strong rule of policy adopted for the public’s benefit and
(ii) the injustice that would result from allowing the government to proceed must
be of sufficient dimension to outweigh the negative effect upon the public interest
or public policy that would result from estopping the government.118
Beginning with the elements necessary to estop a private party, the court
explained that, for estoppel to apply, it had to find (among other things): (i) that
the Commission either knew or should have known that the golf course violated
the conservation easement and (ii) that it was reasonable for the Feduniaks to
believe that failure to enforce the easement signaled the Commission’s acquiescence or assent to the golf course.119 The court determined that neither of these
elements was present, and its discussion provides a window into the challenges
associated with the enforcement of conservation easements.
Regarding the first element, it was undisputed that the Commission did
not know that the golf course violated the easement until the nonprofit holding
the easement informed the Commission of the violation shortly after the
Feduniaks purchased the property.120 The court also rejected the argument that
the Commission should have known of the violation before that time. The court
found no authority suggesting that the Commission had a duty to continually
inspect all properties for compliance with conservation easements and found
that it would not be practical for the Commission to do so.121 The Commission
issued approximately 1,000 permits per year, and the small size of its enforcement
staff, as well as budgetary constraints, made it impossible for the Commission to
continually monitor every property for compliance.122
The court also declined to find that the Commission was or should have been
on notice of the easement violation due to field trips its members and staff took to
sites from which the golf course was clearly visible.123 The court found it
117. Id. at 600–01, 617.
118. Id. at 600–01, 610, 618.
119. Id. at 601–02, 606. Generally speaking, four elements must be present to apply estoppel against
a private party: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so
intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the
conduct to his injury. Id. at 600.
120. Id. at 601. The Commission immediately acted to enforce the easement after being so informed.
Id. at 607.
121. Id. at 603–04. The court also found no authority indicating that the Commission owed a duty of
care to future property buyers to regularly monitor property to prevent them from buying property that is
in violation of applicable restrictions. Id. at 603.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 604.
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unreasonable to expect Commission members and staff to be fully aware at all
times of the permit history of every piece of property within the Commission’s jurisdiction and, thus, to able to tell at a glance whether a particular property complies with permit conditions.124 When preparing to visit a particular site, it was
not routine for Commission personnel to review all other permits in the area.125
As for the second element necessary for estoppel to apply, the court determined
that it was not reasonable for the Feduniaks to believe that the Commission’s failure to enforce the easement for eighteen years signaled its acquiescence or assent
to the golf course.126 The court explained that the Commission’s inaction could
just as well have reflected—and, in fact, did reflect—bureaucratic, budgetary,
and personnel limitations.127 The court also pointed out that, in purchasing the
property, the Feduniaks had relied, not on the Commission’s inaction, but on the
seller’s disclosure statement and the title company’s title report, neither of which
disclosed the easement.128 Bottom line, in assessing whether the two elements
necessary to apply estoppel were present, the court was sympathetic to the difficulties associated with monitoring and enforcing thousands of permit conditions
given the Commission’s small staff and budgetary constraints.
The court next focused on the impact estopping the Commission would have
on public policy and the public interest, cautioning that parties face particularly
daunting odds in establishing estoppel against the government in land use cases
because of the importance of the public interests at stake.129 The law under which
the permit had been granted—the California Coastal Act—reflected a strong
public policy supporting the protection and preservation of California’s unique
coast for the benefit of the public.130 The court determined that estopping the
Commission from enforcing the conservation easement would nullify otherwise
valid land use restrictions adopted for the benefit of the public.131 It also would
not punish the Commission, but would injure the public, which has a strong
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 606–07.
127. Id. The court also explained that mere failure to enforce a law, without more, will not estop the
government from subsequently enforcing it. Id. at 609.
128. Id. at 607.
129. Id. at. 610–11. See also, e.g., Pettitt v. City of Fresno, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) (city not estopped from denying the validity of a building permit that had been issued in violation
of a zoning ordinance despite the property owners’ expenditure of a substantial sum in reliance on the
permit; “To hold that the City can be estopped would not punish the City but it would assuredly injure
the area residents, who in no way can be held responsible for the City’s mistake”); Golden Gate Water
Ski Club v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (owner of an island
designated as open space who built multiple residential cabins and other structures in violation of local
law could not bar county’s enforcement action on estoppel or laches grounds, even though the county
failed to enforce the law for thirty-five years; “what little injustice might result from abating [the
owner’s] illegal use presents no grounds for overriding the significant interest in open space and other
land use limitations benefiting the public interest”).
130. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 613–14.
131. Id. at 614.
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interest in preserving California’s scenic coastline in its natural state.132
Moreover, estopping the Commission could undermine the Commission’s
ability to enforce existing and future permit restrictions on properties along
the entire coast given the Commission’s limited capacity to monitor properties for compliance.133
The court also found that the injustice to Mr. and Mrs. Feduniak from
allowing the Commission to enforce the conservation easement did not outweigh the negative effect on public policy and the public interest that would
result from estopping the Commission. 134 The cost of removal of the golf
course and restoration of the property (estimated to be $100,000) was not a
compelling injury because the Feduniaks could seek to recover that cost
from the previous landowner and the title company, both of which had
failed to disclose the conservation easement. 135 The real injury to the
Feduniaks was that they would no longer be able to own, see, and use a private golf course uniquely situated on the California coast. 136 Though “mindful of the very real impact that losing the future enjoyment of their private
golf course” would have on the Feduniaks, the court held that their loss
could not outweigh the public’s strong interest in (i) eliminating development that had violated the conservation easement’s restrictions for over
twenty years, (ii) finally restoring the area to its natural and native state,
and (iii) protecting the Commission’s ability to enforce existing and future
easements and permit conditions for the benefit of the public.137
In sum, Feduniak was not an extraordinary case where justice demanded
that the government be estopped, despite the Commission’s failure to
enforce the conservation easement for almost two decades and the
Feduniaks’ lack of notice of the easement. The public interest in protecting
California’s coastline clearly outweighed the loss to private landowners
from having to remove their private golf course and restore the land to its
natural state.
The court also summarily dispensed with the Feduniaks’ laches defense, noting
that laches, like estoppel, is not available where it would nullify an important policy adopted for the benefit of the public.138

132. Id.
133. Id. at 615.
134. Id. at 616–17.
135. Id. at 616. The Feduniaks did sue the title company. See, e.g., Feduniak v. Old Republic
National Title Ins. Co., Case No. 5:13–cv–02060 BLF (HRL), 2014 WL 3921372 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(unpublished). The court also noted that the cost burden could not reasonably be considered an injury or
injustice because the Feduniaks had offered the Commission an equivalent amount of money to pay for
off-site mitigation. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 616.
136. Feduniak, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 616.
137. Id. at 617.
138. Id.
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b. Weston Forest
On the other side of the country, a Massachusetts appellate court held that neither laches nor estoppel barred a local nonprofit conservation organization (a land
trust) from enforcing a conservation easement. In Weston Forest and Trail
Association, Inc. v. Fishman, the court explained that, because the enforcement
of a conservation easement carries out a legislatively stated public purpose and is
in the public interest, neither government entities nor land trusts should be barred
from bringing such actions on the grounds of laches or estoppel.139
Weston Forest involved a conservation easement that had been conveyed to
the Weston Forest and Trail Association (“WFTA”) in 1974.140 The easement
encumbered all but 60,000 square feet of an approximately eight-acre parcel
located in Weston, Massachusetts.141 The easement was recorded along with a
map that identified the boundary between the portion of the parcel restricted by
the easement and the portion not so restricted.142 The stated purpose of the easement was to ensure preservation of the restricted area “in its present, predominantly natural and undeveloped condition,” and the easement prohibited the
construction of any buildings or other structures in the restricted area, except for
fencing appropriate for agricultural activities.143
Fishman purchased the property in 1993.144 She was aware that the property
was subject to the conservation easement, and the deed to her specifically referenced the easement.145 Between 1996 and 2002, Fishman engaged a surveyor
who prepared three separate plans for proposed improvements on the property.146
The first plan depicted a proposed new dwelling to be constructed within the
unrestricted area.147 Fishman received a building permit and constructed a new
house in accordance with this plan.148 The second plan depicted a proposed new
barn, also to be constructed within the unrestricted area.149 The first and second
plans each indicated the boundary line between the restricted and unrestricted
areas of the property.150 The third plan omitted that boundary line and placed the
proposed new barn completely within the restricted area.151 Fishman received a
139. 849 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). In Massachusetts, a conservation easement is referred to
as a “conservation restriction.” Id. at 918–19. For simplicity purposes, this discussion uses the term
conservation easement.
140. Id. at 918.
141. Id. at 918–19.
142. Id. at 918.
143. Id. at 919.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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building permit based on the third plan and began constructing the barn in the restricted area.152
During construction of the barn, the Town of Weston’s Conservation
Commission surveyed the property line separating Fishman’s property from
adjacent town-owned land.153 George Bates, who served as both Chair of the
Conservation Commission and Treasurer of WFTA, visited Fishman’s property several times during this period in his role as Commission Chair.154
Bates never communicated with Fishman regarding either the Commission’s
work or the construction of the barn.155
After the barn was substantially completed, WFTA discovered the violation,
notified Fishman, and demanded that the barn be relocated to the unrestricted
area.156 Fishman, who by that time had reportedly invested more than $300,000
in the barn, refused to relocate it.157 WFTA filed suit, arguing that the conservation easement prohibited the construction of any buildings within the restricted
area.158
Fishman did not dispute that the barn was in the restricted area.159 Rather, she
argued that the doctrines of laches and estoppel barred WFTA’s claim.160 The
Massachusetts appellate court disagreed.
Regarding laches, the court explained that the doctrine “‘does not run against
public rights.’”161 The court further explained that the public or private nature of
an entity is not dispositive of whether the entity is enforcing public rights.162 The
court also noted that, in enacting Massachusetts’ conservation easement enabling
statute, the state legislature recognized and sought to protect the public benefits
flowing from conservation easements whether they are held by government
bodies or charitable organizations.163 The court concluded that a nonprofit entity

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 919–20.
158. Id. at 918.
159. Id. at 920.
160. Id. Fishman also argued that the conservation easement was ambiguous. The court quickly
dismissed that argument, noting that the easement explicitly banned the construction of any buildings or
structures in the restricted area other than fences, and the barn was unambiguously a building or
structure. Id. at 922–23.
161. Id. at 920 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 920–21 (citing, for example, Lake Michigan Fed’n. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F.
Supp. 441, 446–47, 447–48, 450 (N.D.Ill. 1990), in which a suit by a nonprofit to prevent extension of a
university campus into Lake Michigan was not barred by laches in part because the nonprofit was
attempting to protect a significant public interest).
163. Id. at 921. The court also noted with approval the trial court judge’s conclusion that laches did
not run against WFTA because enforcement of a conservation easement “‘serves a public benefit,’” and
cited Bennett, see supra Part II.A, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly
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like WFTA should be immune from laches where, as in this case, it seeks to
ensure that a landowner acts in accordance with the public interest.164
As for estoppel, the court explained that, similar to the doctrine of laches,
“‘[e]stoppel is not applied to government acts where to do so would frustrate
a policy intended to protect the public interest.’”165 The court also reiterated
that, although WFTA was not a government entity, for purposes of enforcing
a conservation easement that is in the public interest, there is no difference
between a governmental body and a private entity.166 Accordingly, estoppel
also did not apply.167
The court further explained that even assuming Fishman could assert estoppel
as a defense against WFTA, she still would not have prevailed because her purported reliance on Bates’s failure to object to the barn’s construction was not reasonable.168 Fishman was fully aware of the conservation easement. Moreover,
even though the boundary line between the restricted and unrestricted areas was
not shown on the third building plan, a reasonable person who knew the land was
subject to a conservation easement and who had seen the prior two plans would
have clarified the situation before building.169
In addition, although not mentioned by the court, as with California Coastal
Commission members and staff in Feduniak, it would be unreasonable to expect
WFTA’s board members and staff to be fully aware at all times of the specific
terms of all of WFTA’s conservation easements and, thus, to be able to tell at a
glance whether a conservation easement had been violated.170 Accordingly,
WFTA should not be deemed to have been on notice of the violation simply
because of Bates’s presence on or near the property.
Given that the court found WFTA to be immune from the defenses of laches
and estoppel, it did not consider whether the potential injustice to Fishman from
enforcing the easement would be of sufficient dimension to justify the negative
effects on public policy and the public interest that would arise from barring
WFTA’s enforcement action. However, even if the case had arisen in a jurisdiction in which such a balancing test was applied, the holding should be the same.
If Feduniak, with its innocent landowners and eighteen-year enforcement delay,
did not rise to the level of an “extraordinary” case in which the injustice to the private landowners justified the negative effects on public policy and the public

recognized that the public is the beneficiary of conservation easements and conservation easements
reinforce legislatively stated public purposes. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 922.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. For discussion of this point in Feduniak, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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interest, Weston Forest, with its not-so-innocent landowner and at most thirteenmonth enforcement delay, clearly should not.171
Fishman’s injuries (the time and costs associated with the litigation and relocation of the barn) were self-inflicted—she either knowingly or at least negligently
violated the conservation easement. In addition, barring enforcement of the conservation easement would have nullified an otherwise valid land use restriction
that had been adopted for the benefit of the public. It also would not have punished WFTA but would have injured the public, which was the beneficiary of the
easement. Barring enforcement would further have undermined land trust
enforcement of existing and future conservation easements because nonprofits,
like government holders, face staff and budgetary constraints that prevent them
from continually monitoring and enforcing the easements they hold.172
3. The Way Forward
Because of the importance of the public interests at stake, landowners should
face particularly daunting odds when seeking to bar enforcement of a conservation easement on the grounds of laches or estoppel, even if the easement is held
by a nonprofit land trust instead of a government entity. As the court in Weston
Forest recognized, there is no difference between a governmental entity and a
nonprofit land trust regarding conservation easement enforcement. Both entities
are authorized by law to acquire, hold, and enforce conservation easements on
behalf of the public and, in enforcement actions, both are safeguarding vital public interests.
Barring enforcement of conservation easements on the grounds of laches or estoppel would also have serious deleterious consequences. It would effectively
nullify otherwise valid land use restrictions that were acquired for the benefit of
the public and often at considerable public expense. It would not punish the holders but would injure the public, which is the beneficiary of the easements. It
would undermine the ability of holders to enforce existing and future conservation easements because both government and nonprofit holders have limited
capacity to monitor and enforce the easements they hold. Moreover, it could encourage owners of easement-encumbered land, such as Fishman, to play the
“enforcement lottery,” where they violate easements assuming that, because of
the holder’s staff and budgetary constraints, they either will not be caught or, if
they are caught, it will not be immediate and they can bar enforcement by asserting laches or estoppel.

171. Fishman began construction of the barn in July 2002 and WFTA notified Fishman of the
violation in August 2003. Weston Forest, 849 N.E.2d at 919.
172. The typical schedule for monitoring is at least once per calendar year. See, e.g., Land Trust
Accreditation Commission, Accreditation Requirements Manual 23 (March 2021) (Indicator Element 11C2),
https://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/storage/downloads/2021/requirements/2021_requirements_manual.pdf.
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Even if the holder of a conservation easement is negligent in discovering a violation or asserting a claim, or led the landowner to believe that a prohibited activity or use was acceptable, the interests of the public should not be forfeited as a
result. To paraphrase the Supreme Court in United States v. California, the public
should not be deprived of its rights by rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property.173 And individuals who have
no authority to dispose of government or nonprofit property should not, by their
conduct, cause the public to lose its valuable rights.174 Whether negligent, or
merely misinformed, or inappropriately generous, employees or agents of a government or nonprofit holder of a conservation easement should not be permitted
to give away valuable rights held for the public good.175
In sum, because of the special status of conservation easements as assets that
benefit the public and carry out legislatively stated public purposes, applying
laches or estoppel to bar their enforcement should be hen’s-teeth rare.176 In some
jurisdictions, like Massachusetts, government entities and nonprofit land trusts
will simply be immune from the defenses.177 In other jurisdictions, the defenses
should apply only in the most extraordinary cases—where both the traditional
requirements of the defenses are met and it is clear that the injustice to the landowner from enforcing the easement would be of sufficient dimension to justify
the significant deleterious effects on public policy and the public interest that
would result from barring enforcement.
C.

MERGER

In an unfortunate opinion, Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Water Works Board of
Birmingham, the Alabama Supreme Court applied the common law doctrine of
merger to hold that Birmingham’s Water Works Board could not establish and
hold a conservation easement on property that it owned and, thus, it had not satisfied its obligation to place a conservation easement on that property.178 Although
the court acknowledged that conservation easements are “statutorily created
173. 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947).
174. See id. at 40.
175. See id. at 39-40; supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also 2005 CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 470 (the defenses of laches and estoppel “are inappropriate to
conservation easements because the public interest in conservation needs to be protected from the
potentially poor stewardship practices of a given holder”).
176. This turn of phrase is borrowed from Costa v. INS, 233 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2000), in which the
court explained that asserting estoppel against the government is more easily said than done and, given
the rigors of the gauntlet that must be run, “if it exists at all [it] is hen’s-teeth rare.”
177. Only one state enabling statute—New York’s—expressly provides that enforcement of a
conservation easement shall not be defeated by the defenses of laches or estoppel. N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV.
LAW § 49-0305.5. In other states the issue is left to the courts.
178. _ So.3d _, 2022 WL 571047 (Ala. 2022). In a 2001 settlement agreement with the Alabama
Attorney General, the Water Works Board had agreed to place a conservation easement on the property
to permanently protect it from harmful development. Id. at *1–*3. In 2017, the Water Works Board
established an easement on the property with the consent of the Attorney General but two conservation
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interests” that “differ from common-law easements,” it nonetheless applied the
old common law rule that “if title in fee to the dominant and servient estates is
vested in one owner, the easement rights are merged in the title in fee.”179 The
court did not consider whether it makes sense to apply that old common law rule,
which developed to eliminate easements that do not serve any function, to conservation easements, which are assets created to benefit the public and carry out
legislatively stated public purposes.180 Two other courts have considered this
issue and concluded that it does not make sense to apply the common law doctrine of merger to conservation easements.
In each of Canyon Vineyard Estates I v. DeJoria, a California appellate court
decision, and Piedmont Environmental Council v. Malawer, a Virginia trial court
decision, the courts recognized the special status of conservation easements in
holding that merger did not apply to extinguish a conservation easement.181
Although Malawer lacks precedential value, it is discussed below because the
court’s clear-eyed analysis is persuasive. DeJoria and Malawer also illustrate the
varied circumstances in which conservation easements can be created.
DeJoria involved a conservation easement that John Paul DeJoria conveyed to
a nonprofit land trust along with the underlying fee.182 DeJoria had purchased the
subject property—417 acres along the Pacific coast in Malibu, California—
intending to develop it, but after walking the property he decided to preserve it as
open space for the enjoyment of the public.183 DeJoria’s conveyance was in substantial part a charitable gift for which he received a tax deduction.184 The
organizations alleged that the easement did not comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. Id. at
*4–*6.
179. Id. at *11–*12 (citing Gonzalez v. Naman, 678 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), which
involved a dispute between private parties, for the common law rule).
180. The court stated that the requirement that a conservation easement be held by an entity other
than the easement grantor is important because otherwise the owner of the property would also be the
enforcer of the easement. Id. at *12. That rationale is unpersuasive given that the Alabama Attorney
General had the authority to enforce the conservation easement. Id. at *3, *5. In addition, that a
conservation easement is defined in Alabama’s enabling statute as a “nonpossessory interest” should not
be interpreted to require that a conservation easement always be held by an entity other than the
easement grantor. Id. at *10, *12. A government or nonprofit entity could establish a conservation
easement on property that it owns and the easement would be a nonpossessory interest that the entity
could retain either along with or separate from the underlying fee. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a
nonprofit land trust to acquire fee title to property with significant conservation values, encumber the
property with a conservation easement, and then transfer the restricted fee to a third party, subject to the
easement. See, e.g., Piedmont Environmental Council v. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. 116 (2010); supra note
204 and accompanying text.
181. Canyon Vineyard Estates I v. DeJoria, _ Cal. Rptr. 3d _, 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 426 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2022); Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. at 116-17. DeJoria was certified for partial publication and only the
published portions are referenced herein. DeJoria, 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 426 at *1.
182. DeJoria, 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 426 at *2–*4.
183. Id. at *3.
184. Id. DeJoria conveyed the property, which was worth $13 million, to the land trust in exchange
for $1,060,000, thus making a charitable donation of more than 90% of the value of the property. Id.
DeJoria received at tax deduction of $11.4 million for the donation. Id.
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underlying fee was later acquired by a third party in a foreclosure sale, and a successor to that party, who sought to develop the property, argued that the conservation easement was extinguished at the moment of its creation under the doctrine
of merger.185
In holding that merger did not apply to extinguish the conservation easement,
the California appellate court first explained that “[t]he rationale for the merger
doctrine is ‘to avoid nonsensical easements—where they are without doubt
unnecessary because the owner owns the estate.’”186 The court provided an example of the typical case involving merger: where the holder of an easement to cross
property acquires the burdened property, at which point the easement becomes
nothing more than a right by the owner to cross his or her own land.187 In such
a case, the easement’s existence no longer makes sense and it merges into the
owner’s more comprehensive ownership rights.188
The court then explained that merger does not always automatically apply and,
unlike in the typical case described above, extinguishing the conservation easement in DeJoria by merger would (i) do violence to the parties’ intent in that it
would contravene the primary purpose of DeJoria’s conveyance, which was to
preserve the property in its open-space condition in perpetuity, (ii) frustrate the
purpose of California’s conservation easement laws, which seek to encourage
donations for the purpose of preserving open space, and (iii) not operate to avoid
a “nonsensical” easement because the conservation easement remained necessary
to ensure preservation of the property in its natural condition.189 The court also
noted that the current owner of the property’s attempt to rely on the merger doctrine to extinguish the conservation easement inappropriately “conflate[d] conservation easements with general easements or general servitudes.”190 The court
concluded that merger did not apply to extinguish the conservation easement
even though the easement had been conveyed to and held by the land trust along
with the underlying fee.191
Malawer involved a different factual situation, namely a conservation easement that was established by a nonprofit land trust, the Piedmont Environmental
Council (“PEC”), on property that it owned.192 PEC had acquired fee title to the
subject property and then conveyed a conservation easement encumbering that
property to itself and the Virginia Outdoors Foundation (“VOF”), a quasi-state

185. Id. at *5–*6, *19. The land trust to which the conservation easement and underlying fee had
been conveyed defaulted on a loan secured by the property, leading to a third party’s acquisition of the
underlying fee in a foreclosure sale. Id. at *5–*6.
186. Id. at *19 (citation omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id. at *19–*20.
189. Id. at *20–*21.
190. Id. at *21.
191. Id. at *21–*22.
192. Piedmont Environmental Council v. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. 116, 117 (2010).
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agency.193 PEC was thus both the grantor and one of the grantees of the
easement.
Immediately following conveyance of the conservation easement, PEC conveyed the underlying property, subject to the easement, to Martha Michael
Malawer.194 In the context of a later suit involving interpretation of some of the
easement’s terms, Malawer argued that PEC did not have the legal ability to create the easement because the doctrine of merger does not allow the holder of a fee
simple interest and an easement burdening that interest to be the same person.195
In determining that merger did not apply and, thus, that the conservation easement was valid, the trial court first noted the basic common law rule that “existing
easements are extinguished by operation of law if ownership of the dominant and
servient estate become united in one person.”196 The court referenced an earlier
case in which the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, when the holder of a dominant tract benefited by a right-of-way easement acquires the servient tract, the
right-of-way easement is extinguished by merger.197 In such a case, the owner of
the dominant tract and the owner of the servient tract become one and the same,
thus “eliminating the need or purpose for the easement.”198 In other words, the
right-of-way easement is extinguished because it ceases to serve any function—
the owner of the two tracts is free to use the servient estate as the owner sees
fit.199 This “common sense” approach and analysis, said the court, stands in contrast to what occurred in Malawer.200
In Malawer, there never was a relationship between a dominant tract and a servient tract because PEC and the VOF held the conservation easement in gross.201
Moreover, the parties’ clear intent was to create a conservation easement in perpetuity to protect the scenic value of the subject property for the benefit of the
general public.202 The court emphasized that the clear intent of PEC as grantor
was “to retain the right to enforce the scenic easement for a public purpose.”203
The fact that PEC held the conservation easement and the encumbered fee prior
to conveyance of the encumbered fee to Malawer did nothing to eliminate the
need for or purpose of the conservation easement.
193. Id. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1800 et. seq. (establishing the Virginia Outdoors
Foundation).
194. Id. at 116.
195. Id. at 117, 119.
196. Id. at 117
197. Id. (citing Davis v. Henning, 462 S.E.2d 106 (Va. 1995)).
198. Id. at 118.
199. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and The Doctrine of Merger, 74 DUKE J.L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 287 (2011) (“The merger doctrine automatically eliminates land use
restrictions that no longer serve any function”).
200. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. at 117–18.
201. Id. at 118. See also supra note 10, explaining that an easement in gross is not held appurtenant to
an estate in land but is imposed upon land with the benefit running to an individual or entity.
202. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. at 118.
203. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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The court further noted that, “most importantly, this type of easement in gross
is a recent creature of the law, created statutorily in an effort to facilitate this type
of conservation.”204 Citing Blackman, in which the Virginia Supreme Court discussed the history and strong public policy in favor of the use of conservation
easements, the court concluded that it was evident that conservation easements
“are not subject to the typical common law analysis of merger as would be appropriate to rights of way between two adjoining tracts.”205 In sum, because creation
of a conservation easement by a nonprofit or government owner of the underlying
fee does not eliminate the need for or public purpose of the easement, and application of the merger doctrine to conservation easements would frustrate the purpose of state laws facilitating this type of conservation, the doctrine of merger
should not apply.206
Addressing yet another factual situation, the Virginia Attorney General opined
that the doctrine of merger does not apply when the holder of a conservation easement later acquires the underlying fee.207 Citing to Malawer, the Attorney
General explained that acquisition of the underlying fee would not obviate the
purpose of or need for the conservation easement.208 Rather, “the easement would
continue to provide natural or historic resource protection in accordance with its
stated terms and in furtherance of state policy.”209
The Attorney General also noted a practical consequence of extinguishing
conservation easements by merger. Most conservation easements are intended to
permanently protect the conservation and historic values of the property they encumber. Both federal and state laws and the specific terms of many conservation
easement deeds place strict limits on extinguishment.210 Applying the doctrine of
204. Id. The court was not troubled by the fact that Virginia’s enabling statute, like Alabama’s
enabling statute, both of which are based on the UCEA, defines a conservation easement as a “nonpossessory interest” in real property. Id.
205. Id. at 118–19. For discussion of Blackman, see supra Part II.A.
206. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. at 118–19. See also Wolf, supra note 6, at 803 (“There seems to be little
logic and a lot of bad public policy behind application of this traditional rule [i.e., merger] to easements
that are designed to be perpetual and in the public interest. The identity of the owner of the property
subject to a conservation restriction is irrelevant to the purpose of the restriction.”). For an earlier case in
which a Montana court determined that merger did not apply in circumstances similar to those in
Malawer, but without acknowledging the special status of conservation easements, see Madden v.
Nature Conservancy, 823 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mont. 1992).
207. Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia, Advisory Opinion (Aug. 31, 2012),
2012 WL 4044318 [hereinafter Va. Attorney General Advisory Opinion].
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id.
210. See id. at *2. For federal limits on extinguishment, see, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying
text (discussing the federal tax law judicial extinguishment requirements, which generally are
incorporated into conservation easement deeds when the donor intends to claim a deduction). For state
limits on extinguishment, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1704 (prohibiting public bodies from
releasing conservation easements unless certain statutory requirements are met, including the protection
of similar land as a substitute); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-107 (requiring a judicial proceeding and
satisfaction of additional statutory requirements to extinguish a conservation easement); MASS. G.L.
C.184, § 32 (authorizing release of a conservation easement only after, among other things, a public
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merger to conservation easements would permit and even encourage parties to
circumvent these limits in contravention of the easement grantors’ intent and the
public interest.211 For example, the holder of a conservation easement and a subsequent owner of the underlying property could agree to extinguish the easement
via merger to make way for lucrative development and share the proceeds, even
if the easement continued to protect conservation values of great importance to
the public.212
Extinguishment of a conservation easement via merger could also confer a significant windfall benefit upon the owner of the subject property at the public’s
expense. This reality was illustrated in DeJoria, in which the court explained that
a finding that the underlying property was not subject to a valid conservation
easement would have conferred a significant windfall benefit on the current
owner of the property, who had purchased the 417 acres of prime Pacific coastland for development for a price that reflected the easement’s prohibition on development.213 Such a finding also would have deprived taxpayers, who had paid
for the property’s protection by subsidizing DeJoria’s $11.4 million tax deduction, of the benefits they had obtained.214
Several states have clarified by statute that merger does not apply to extinguish
conservation easements.215 This does not mean that merger should apply in other
states. As the courts in DeJoria and Malawer recognized, conservation easements
hearing and approval of public officials); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477-A (West 2007) (requiring a
judicial proceeding and satisfaction of additional statutory requirements to extinguish a conservation
easement).
211. See Va. Attorney General Advisory Opinion, supra note 207, at *2.
212. Such extinguishments could be expected to discourage conservation easement donations.
Individuals interested in permanently protecting properties that have special meaning to them, their
families, and their communities would not be inclined to make the economic sacrifice associated with a
conservation easement donation if their intent could be so easily ignored. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
213. Canyon Vineyard Estates I v. DeJoria, _ Cal. Rptr. 3d _, 2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 426. at *29
(Cal. Ct. App. 2022). If the court in Malawer had held that the conservation easement at issue was
extinguished by merger, the value attributable to that easement would similarly have passed to Malawer
as an economic windfall.
214. Id. at *30.
215. See, e.g., 765 ILCS 120/6 (“A conservation right shall not be extinguished by . . . merger”); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 479(10) (West 2007) (“A conservation easement is valid even though . . . [t]he
title to the real property subject to the conservation easement has been acquired by the holder”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 89-19-5(5) (West 1988) (“A conservation easement shall continue to be effective and shall
not be extinguished if the easement holder is or becomes the owner in fee of the subject property”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-111(2) (2007) (“A conservation easement may not be extinguished by taking
fee title to the land to which the conservation easement is attached”). Colorado’s enabling statute
provides that “[a] conservation easement in gross for which a Colorado state income tax credit has been
allowed may not in whole or in part be released, terminated, extinguished, or abandoned by merger.”
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-107. Although this statute might be interpreted to mean that merger
applies to extinguish conservation easements for which a Colorado state income tax credit was not
allowed, two factors cut against drawing that conclusion. First is the commonsense analysis in DeJoria
and Malawer—regardless of whether a state income tax credit was allowed, retention or acquisition of
the underlying fee by the government or nonprofit holder of a conservation easement does not eliminate
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are fundamentally different from the traditional easements (like right-of-way
easements) to which the doctrine of merger was developed to apply. Moreover,
courts should not impute to state legislatures the inherently irrational conclusion
that conservation easements are to be encouraged and heavily subsidized by the
public, only to have the public benefits and public investment lost through misapplication of a doctrine developed to eliminate “nonsensical” easements.
In conclusion, Cahaba Riverkeeper involved a very unusual situation—elimination of an existing conservation easement so that it could be replaced with a
more protective conservation easement.216 In most cases involving merger, the
goal is to eliminate the conservation easement to allow the underlying property to
be developed or otherwise used in manners contrary to the easement’s protections, as in DeJoria and Malawer. As the foregoing discussion has illustrated,
applying the common law doctrine of merger to conservation easements, which
are created to benefit the public and carry out legislatively stated public purposes,
would be inconsistent with the rationale for the doctrine, which is to eliminate
easements that do not serve any function. It also would be contrary to the public
interest and frustrate the purpose of state laws that facilitate this type of conservation. Accordingly, as the law on merger develops, courts should look to the analysis and holdings in DeJoria and Malawer. They should also view the merger
holding in Cahaba Riverkeeper as an example of the adage that “hard cases make
bad law” and either decline to follow it or confine it to its unusual facts.217
D.

SUBDIVISION RESTRICTIONS (RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION)

It is fairly common for a conservation easement to prohibit subdivision of the
subject property into two or more parcels that could be sold or otherwise transferred to separate owners. These “subdivision restrictions” are fairly common
because ensuring that the subject property will forever be owned by a single person or group of persons can further a conservation easement’s purposes in several
ways.
First, subdivision restrictions are often included in conservation easements that
permit only one residence and ancillary structures on the subject property.
Prohibiting subdivision in such a case ensures that the owner of the residence will
also continue to own and be responsible for the management and care of the
remaining undevelopable property. If subdivision were permitted, the residential
parcel could be severed from the undevelopable property. Successive owners of
the undevelopable property, who could not reside on that property, might not take
the need for or public purpose of the easement. Second, the strict limits on extinguishment in the
Colorado enabling statute could be easily circumvented if merger applied. See supra note 210.
216. Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Water Works Bd. of Birmingham, _ So.3d _, 2022 WL 571047 at
*13 (Ala. 2022).
217. The adage is derived from Northern Securities Co. v United States, 193 US 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes dissenting). For an interesting discussion of the adage, see Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make
Bad Law?, 73 U. CHIC L. REV. 883 (2006).
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as active a role in its management and care. They also might be more likely
at some point over the perpetual life of the easement to seek release of the
restrictions preventing development and other economically productive
uses.
A subdivision restriction also ensures that the subject property will be owned
and managed by a single owner or group of owners, thereby reducing the difficulties and costs associated with the holder’s monitoring and enforcement of the
easement. It generally is simpler and less expensive for a holder to communicate
with, monitor the activities of, and file enforcement actions against the owner or
owners of a single parcel, as opposed to different owners of two or more subdivided parcels. In addition, subdivision of a property subject to a conservation
easement can lead to conflicts regarding the interpretation, enforcement, or
amendment of the easement, as the owner of one or more of the subdivided parcels may object to the holder’s administration of the easement as it relates to the
other subdivided parcel or parcels.218
In Taylor v. Taylor, an Ohio appellate court recognized the special status of a
conservation easement in holding that the easement’s perpetual restriction on
subdivision was not invalid as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.219 The conservation easement in Taylor encumbered a 76.68-acre parcel in Butler County,
Ohio, that was owned by siblings as tenants in common.220 The purpose of the
easement was to ensure that the conservation values of the property would be preserved and the property would be retained forever in its natural and agricultural
condition, and to prevent any use of the property that would significantly impair
or interfere with the conservation values of the property or be inconsistent with
the purpose of the easement.221
One of the siblings, a sister, who reportedly wanted to liquidate her interest but
could not persuade her brother to purchase it, filed a suit for partition.222 In a partition action, an appraiser would determine the property’s value as a whole, and either cotenant could then purchase the other cotenant’s interest, or the property
could be sold as a whole to a third party and the proceeds distributed to the cotenants in accordance with their respective interests.223 The sister maintained that the

218. Courts have been confronted with the question of whether the owner of one such parcel has
standing to sue to object to the holder’s administration of the easement on another such parcel. See, e.g.,
Estate of Robbins v. Chebeague & Cumberland Land Tr., 154 A.3d 1185 (Me. 2017) (owner of one of
several parcels encumbered by a single conservation easement lacked standing to sue to enforce the
easement on other parcels). But see, e.g., McKean v. Douglas Cty., No. 18-CV-01012 (Douglas Cty. Dist.
Ct. Nev., Nov. 2, 2018, and Jan. 29, 2019) (neighbor had standing to challenge county’s agreement to
amend a conservation easement on nearby property).
219. 110 N.E.3d 651 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
220. Id. at 652.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 652, 654.
223. Id. at 654.
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partition action was necessary because the easement’s subdivision restriction prevented division of the property into two or more parcels.224
The brother objected to the partition action. 225 He argued that the subdivision restriction should be invalidated as an undue restraint on alienability
because it did not contain a reasonable limit on its duration. 226 If the subdivision restriction were invalidated, the property could be divided into two
parcels and each parcel could be sold separately, subject to the conservation
easement. 227
The nonprofit land trust holding the conservation easement weighed in on the
sister’s side, explaining that the subdivision restriction should not be invalidated
because it was essential to carrying out the purpose of the easement.228 The land
trust noted that the subdivision restriction helped to ensure that there would be
only one residence and related infrastructure on the property, that only one owner
would manage the property, and that the land trust’s administrative costs in stewarding the property would be minimized.229 The land trust also explained the subdivision restriction was an appropriate measure by which to achieve the purposes
listed in Ohio’s conservation easement enabling statute, namely “retaining the
property in its ‘natural, scenic, open, or wooded condition’ and as a ‘suitable habitat for fish, plants, or wildlife.’”230
The Ohio appellate court sided with the sister and the land trust. The court
determined that the subdivision restriction was not an undue restraint on alienability because its operation was limited, it had a clear purpose, and its perpetual
duration was reasonable in light of its purpose.231 The subdivision restriction’s
operation was limited because it did not prohibit the sale or partition of the property; it merely prohibited dividing the property into two or more parcels.232 The
property could still be sold as a whole if all cotenants agreed, and each cotenant
was free to sell their cotenant interest or bring a suit for partition. In addition, the
purpose of the conservation easement, including the subdivision restriction

224. Id.
225. Id. at 652–53.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 654.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 656. The court distinguished a 1975 case involving a property owned by twenty-one
cotenants who had agreed that any decision relating to the property, including a decision to sell, required
a majority vote. Id. at 654–56 (distinguishing Raisch v. Schuster, 352 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)).
In Raisch, the cotenants’ agreement effectively prohibited the sale or partition of the property without
the consent of the majority and thus operated as an absolute restraint upon alienability unless there was
majority agreement. Id. at 655. The court in Raisch held that the restriction was void as against public
policy because there was no evidence of the purpose of the agreement and no way to determine whether
it was subject to a reasonable limit on its duration. Id.
232. Id. at 656.
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therein, was conservation of the subject property, and the easement’s perpetual
duration was reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose.233
Equally important, however, was that the conservation easement in Taylor had
been granted pursuant to the Ohio conservation easement enabling statute, which
had been enacted “for the ‘public purpose of retaining land, water, or wetland
areas predominantly in their natural, scenic, open, or wooded condition.’”234 The
enabling statute also specifically authorized charitable organizations like the land
trust to hold conservation easements for “the preservation of land areas” for various purposes intended to benefit the public.235 Considered in light of the enabling statute, the court found that the subdivision restriction was neither
contrary to public policy generally nor inconsistent with the public policy
expressed in the statute.236 Rather, the restriction furthered public policy in
favor of land conservation.
The court also noted that the land trust had paid $30,000 for the conservation easement.237 Although the court did not elaborate, the investment of
charitable funds in the easement further confirmed its status as an asset
acquired and held for the benefit of the public. Moreover, invalidation of the
subdivision restriction might have conferred a windfall benefit on the siblings
at the public’s expense.238
As with the courts in Bennett, Blackman, Feduniak, Weston Forest, DeJoria,
and Malawer, the court in Taylor found the special status of conservation easements to be persuasive.239 Including a subdivision restriction in a perpetual conservation easement is permissible because the restriction does not operate as an
absolute restraint upon alienability, the beneficiary of the restriction is the public,
and the restriction reinforces a legislatively stated public purpose.
E.

INTERPRETATION

Eleven years after its decision in Blackman, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was faced with a conservation easement interpretation case.240 In Wetlands
America Trust v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, a divided court held that the common law principle that restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed in favor
of free use of property (referred to as the “strict construction principle”) applied
233. Id. at 655–56.
234. Id. at 656.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The land trust used charitable funds to acquire the conservation easement, including the
subdivision restriction. Invalidation of the subdivision restriction might have increased the fair market
value of the subject property and decreased the value of the easement, thereby conferring a windfall
benefit on the siblings.
239. For discussion of Bennett and Blackman, see supra Part II.A. For discussion of Feduniak and
Weston Forest, see supra Part II.B.2. For discussion of DeJoria and Malawer, see supra Part II.C.
240. For discussion of Blackman, see supra Part II.A.
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to conservation easements.241 Two judges issued a strong dissent, arguing that
applying that principle was inappropriate given the special status of conservation
easements.242 The Virginia Attorney General filed an amicus brief in the case,
similarly arguing that applying the strict construction principle to conservation
easements would be inappropriate and unjust.243 The dissenting judges and the
Attorney General had the better argument.
In Wetlands America Trust, the owner of a winery purchased adjacent property
that was subject to a conservation easement and began to conduct certain agricultural and construction activities on that property in connection with the winery.244
Wetlands America Trust (“WAT”), the easement holder, filed suit, arguing that
some of the construction activities and intended commercial uses of the easement-encumbered property violated the easement.245 Applying the strict construction principle, the lower court construed all ambiguities in the conservation
easement deed against WAT and in favor of the property owner and “free use” of
the property.246 This manner of interpretation caused the lower court to side with
the property owner regarding almost all of the activities that WAT challenged.247
On appeal, a majority of the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court.248 As to application of the strict construction principle to conservation
easements, the majority reasoned that, although the Virginia Conservation
Easement Act (“VCEA”) had abrogated the common law relative to conservation easements in “certain significant respects,” it had not abrogated application of the strict construction principle.249 Accordingly, the majority held
that the lower court was correct in determining that all ambiguities in the conservation easement deed had to be resolved against the restrictions and in
favor of the free use of property.250
The dissenting judges did not take a position on whether the property owner’s
activities violated the conservation easement; they focused solely on the proper
241. 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016).
242. Id. at 144–46.
243. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant,
Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 2015 WL 10478421 (No. 141577) (May 26, 2015)
[hereinafter Virginia Attorney General Amicus Brief].
244. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 134. Among other things, the owner of the winery commenced
construction of a building on the easement-encumbered property to be used for storage; to house a
creamery, a bakery, a wine tasting room, and a retail space; and to host events such as music festivals
and weddings. Id.; Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 88 Va. Cir. 341, 349–50 (2014).
The owner also commenced construction of a parking lot adjoining the building, a new road leading to
the parking lot, and a new bridge. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 134.
245. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 134.
246. Wetlands Am. Tr., 88 Va. Cir. at 345, 346.
247. Id. at 348–73.
248. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 134.
249. Id. at 137–38. The majority stated that the VCEA abrogated the common law by approving a
conservation easement that was in gross, imposed restrictions on the use of the subject land, and was
perpetual in duration. Id.
250. Id. at 137–39.
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rules to apply in interpreting conservation easements and they determined that
the strict construction principle should not apply.251 They explained that the strict
construction principle was applied under the common law because, historically,
easements in gross, including negative easements in gross, were disfavored
as a matter of public policy.252 But things had changed. By 2016, when the
Virginia Supreme Court handed down its decision in Wetlands America Trust,
public policy in Virginia had for decades strongly favored the use of conservation
easements to accomplish land conservation and historic preservation goals.253
Applying a principle based on a policy disfavoring easements in gross to conservation easements simply could not be reconciled with the State’s decades-long
and strong public policy in favor of conservation easements.254 The “oft-stated
policy of the Commonwealth in favor of conservation easements,” said the
judges, “could not be a clearer rejection of the common law strict construction
principle.”255
The dissenting judges’ position was similar to that of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Bennett, in which that court explained: “Where the beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restriction reinforces a legislatively
stated public purpose, old common law rules barring the creation and enforcement
of easements in gross have no continuing force.”256 Like the court in Bennett, the
dissenting judges in Wetlands America Trust recognized that conservation easements are fundamentally different from the traditional easements in gross to which
the strict construction principle historically applied. They also implicitly understood that the common law is dynamic and evolves as societal needs and conditions change.257 Like the court in Bennett, they were willing to reconsider certain
common law rules that may no longer be sound in appropriate cases.258
The dissenting judges also rejected the majority’s myopic focus on the strict
construction principle, explaining that the common law rules of contract construction are applied in the construction of deeds.259 Based on those rules, the

251. Id. at 144–46. The Virginia Attorney General also focused solely on the proper rules to apply in
interpreting conservation easements and similarly argued that the strict construction principle should not
apply to conservation easements. Virginia Attorney General Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 1–2.
252. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 145.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Bennett v. Comm’r of Food and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Mass. 1991). For discussion of
Bennett, see supra Part II.A.
257. See, e.g., Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Va. 1971) (“The nature of the common law
requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions
and needs of the times have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument of
injustice.”); Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 16 (Va. 2012) (“‘The common law is dynamic,
evolves to meet developing societal problems, and is adaptable to society’s requirements at the time of
its application by the Court’” (citation omitted)).
258. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
259. Wetlands Am. Tr., 782 S.E.2d at 145–46.
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dissent determined that ambiguities in a conservation easement deed should be
construed to give effect to the intention of the parties, to give effect to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement, to carry out the policy in favor
of land conservation, and to resolve ambiguities in favor of the grantee.260
Although not mentioned by the dissent, there was an additional rule of law relevant to the interpretation of the conservation easement in Wetlands America
Trust—the rule governing the interpretation of charitable gifts. As previously
explained, it is well settled that charitable gifts are highly favored by the courts
and liberally construed to carry out the donors’ intended charitable purposes.261
The Virginia Supreme Court has articulated this rule as follows: “‘Charitable
gifts are viewed with peculiar favor by the courts, and every presumption consistent with the language contained in the instruments of gift will be employed in
order to sustain them.’ All doubts will be resolved in their favor.”262
The conservation easement in Wetlands America Trust was conveyed to a
charitable organization—WAT—pursuant to a “Deed of Gift of Conservation
Easement” and, thus, as a charitable gift.263 Moreover, the drafters of the UCEA,
which Virginia adopted in the form of the VCEA, explained that the UCEA specifically “leaves intact” case and statutory law as it relates to the enforcement of
charitable gifts.264 Accordingly, all doubts about the meaning of the terms of the
conservation easement should have been resolved, not in favor of the free use of
land, but in favor of carrying out the stated charitable conservation purpose of the
gift.265

260. Id. at 146. The dissent pointed out that this “settled Virginia law” is consistent with the standard
for interpreting servitudes in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.1 (AM. LAW INST.
2000). Id. See also, e.g., Davis v. Henning, 462 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Va. 1995) (“In construing deeds, it is
the duty of the court to ‘ascertain the intention of the parties, gathered from the language used, and the
general purpose and scope of the instrument in the light of surrounding circumstances’” (citation
omitted)); Chatham Conservation Found., Inc. v. Farber, 779 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Mass. App. Ct 2002) (a
conservation easement “‘must be construed beneficially, according to the apparent purpose of protection
or advantage . . . it was intended to secure or promote’” (citation omitted)); State v. Rattee, 761 A.2d
1076, 1082–83 (N.H. 2000) (a state agency’s decision not to approve construction of a 5,500 square foot
home on land protected by agricultural conservation easement was reasonable considering easements’
statutory purpose and availability of alternative site).
261. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
262. Thomas v. Bryant, 40 S.E.2d 487, 490 (Va. 1946) (quoting Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary
Soc’y, 30 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Ill, 1940)). See also Smith v. Moore, 343 F.2d 594, 604 (4th Cir. 1965).
263. See Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 88 Va. Cir. 341, 342 (2014); About
Wetlands America Trust, WETLANDS AMERICA (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.wetlandsamerica.org/aboutwetlands-america-trust. Conservation easements are often conveyed in whole or in part as charitable
gifts because of the tax incentives that are available to property owners who make such gifts, as well as
the desire on the part of many to ensure the perpetual protection of property that has special meaning to
them, their families, and their communities. See, e.g., supra notes 19, 24, and 46 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 49 and accompanying text, discussing the UCEA.
265. See id. The land trusts that filed an amicus brief in Wetlands America Trust explained that
construing conservation easements in favor of free use of land rather than to carry out the charitable
conservation intent of the easement donors would chill future easement donations, contrary to the public
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Finally, the majority in Wetlands America Trust made an additional assertion
in support of its free-use-of-property holding that the dissenting judges did not
address but is worthy of comment. The majority stated that
by leaving the strict construction principle in force with the passage of the
VCEA, the legislature must have viewed this principle as an appropriate additional incentive for those who draft the conservation easements to achieve
clarity in light of the fact that [conservation easements] are subject to enforcement in perpetuity.266

In other words, according to the majority, the Virginia legislature must have
intended that application of the strict construction principle would motivate
drafters of conservation easements to be clear about permitted and prohibited
uses and avoid ambiguities. The majority cited no support for this assertion,
which is not surprising given that it is contrary to the realities of conservation
easement drafting.
As explained in the first edition of the Conservation Easement Handbook,
although conservation easements are drafted to specify certain permitted and prohibited uses, it is impossible to foresee every conceivable future use or variation
of use over the perpetual life of a conservation easement.267 Accordingly, the
stated purpose of a conservation easement serves as its “touchstone,” and all
unforeseen potential future uses must be tested against that touchstone.268 Thus,
conservation easements are generally drafted to provide that unforeseen future
uses are permitted if they are consistent with the easement’s stated purpose and
prohibited if they are inconsistent with that purpose.269
The conservation easement at issue in Wetlands America Trust was drafted in
this manner. It states that the parties recognize that the easement cannot address
every circumstance that might arise in the future; the parties agree upon the stated
purpose of the easement; and any uses that are not expressly prohibited or permitted in the easement are permitted if they are consistent with the easement’s stated
purpose and prohibited if they are inconsistent with that purpose.270 In his amicus
interest. See Brief of the Nature Conservancy et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Wetlands
Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 2015 WL 10478422, at 29–30 (No. 141577) (May 22, 2015).
266. Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 782 S.E.2d 131,138 (Va. 2016).
267. See 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 43, at 174. For example, fifty years
ago it would have been impossible to predict the placement of cell-phone towers on easement-protected
lands, or a change in forestry practices to favor prescribed or cultural burns, or the use of drones to
monitor compliance with a conservation easement.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Wetlands Am. Tr. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 88 Va. Cir. 341, 355 (2014). The purpose of
the easement in Wetlands America Trust is “to assure that the Protected Property will be retained in
perpetuity predominantly in its natural, scenic, and open condition . . . for conservation purposes as well
as permitted agricultural pursuits, and to prevent any use of the Protected Property which will impair
significantly or interfere with the conservation values of the Protected Property, its wildlife habitat,
natural resources or associated ecosystem.” Id. at 348.
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brief, the Virginia Attorney General highlighted the need to draft conservation
easements in this manner, explaining, for example, that “[i]t is impossible to predict what forms agriculture . . . may take in the decades after an easement is
donated.”271
Accordingly, contrary to the majority’s assertion, it seems unlikely that the
Virginia legislature intended that the strict construction principle would motivate
drafters of conservation easements to do the impossible—foresee and articulate
every potential permitted and prohibited use over the perpetual life of a conservation easement. In addition, the UCEA, on which the VCEA is based, “has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away certain common law impediments
which might otherwise undermine the easements’ validity” and does not directly
address the interpretation issue in either the act itself or the commentary.272 Thus,
it seems more likely that the Virginia legislature, in enacting the VCEA, never
considered the interpretation issue.
Had the Virginia legislature considered the interpretation issue, it likely would
have learned that applying the strict construction principle to conservation easements could significantly undermine the effectiveness of such easements as land
conservation and historic preservation tools. Such a principle favors the property
owner and puts the nonprofit or government holder at a distinct disadvantage. It
provides property owners with a powerful incentive to challenge or violate conservation easement restrictions and it discourages nonprofit and government
holders from seeking to enforce those restrictions on behalf of the public. As a
result, many of the promised conservation benefits and much of the public investment in conservation easements could be lost over time as easement restrictions
erode.
In addition, as the Virginia Attorney General explained in his amicus brief,
purchasers of property subject to a conservation easement voluntarily take title
with at least constructive notice of the easement’s restrictions and stated purpose.273 Such purchasers also typically pay a reduced price because of the existence of the easement.274 Accordingly, such purchasers should not be viewed as
unduly burdened by the interpretation of a conservation easement consistent with
its stated conservation purpose. Instead, they should be viewed as stepping into
the shoes of the easement grantor and having the same intent—that the restrictions will be enforced to carry out the stated purpose of the conservation
easement.275
Given the foregoing, it seems likely that if the Virginia legislature had considered the interpretation issue, it would have provided that the strict construction
271. Virginia Attorney General Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 20.
272. UCEA, supra note 16, Prefatory Note at 2.
273. See Virginia Attorney General Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 19.
274. Id. Such purchasers may also receive other economic benefits, such as reduced property taxes.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
275. See Virginia Attorney General Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 7–8.
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principle does not apply to conservation easements and that such easements must
be interpreted to carry out their public-benefitting conservation purposes. In fact,
the Virginia legislature recently revised the VCEA to do just that. The statute
now provides: “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an easement held pursuant to this chapter shall be construed in favor of achieving the
conservation purposes for which it was created.”276
The Virginia legislature, the dissenting judges in Wetlands America Trust, and
the Virginia Attorney General all rejected application of the strict construction
principle to conservation easements. In doing so, they recognized that applying
an old common law principle intended to facilitate the free use of land to conservation easements, the very purpose of which is to constrain the free use of land to
provide benefits to the public, would be nonsensical and contrary to public
policy.
CONCLUSION
The widespread use of conservation easements to accomplish land protection
goals is an experiment and one that is being conducted on a grand scale. We have
no guarantee that conservation easements will prove to be effective long-term
land protection tools—it is simply too early to tell. This Article addresses one significant risk to conservation easements and the benefits they provide to the public:
the tendency of courts in enforcement cases, misled by the “easement” moniker,
to treat conservation easements as if they were traditional servitudes.
This Article has articulated the various ways in which conservation easements
are fundamentally different from traditional servitudes. It has provided a roadmap
of the various bodies of law that may be relevant in conservation easement
enforcement cases. It also has brought together the handful of cases over the past
three decades in which the courts (in one case, the dissenting judges) recognized
the special status of conservation easements as assets created to benefit the public
and carry out legislatively stated public purposes. These courts understood that it

276. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1016.1. The same provision was added to the conservation easement
enabling statute in Virginia that validates open space easements conveyed to public bodies. Id. § 10.11705.1. Two other states have similar provisions in their enabling statutes. See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. §
5055(c)(2) (“Any general rule of construction to the contrary notwithstanding, conservation or
preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the
purposes of those easements and the policy and purpose of this act); W. VA. CODE § 20-12-5(b)
(“Notwithstanding provision of law to the contrary, conservation and preservation easements shall be
liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the purposes of those easements and
the policy and purpose of this article”). See also CAL. CIV CODE § 815 (Deering 2021) (“The Legislature
finds and declares that the preservation of land in its natural, scenic, agricultural, historical, forested, or
open-space condition is among the most important environmental assets of California. The Legislature
further finds and declares it to be the public policy and in the public interest of this state to encourage the
voluntary conveyance of conservation easements to qualified nonprofit organizations.”); Id. § 816 (“The
provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate the policy and purpose of
Section 815.”).
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would be contrary to the public interest to blindly apply to conservation easements principles developed to facilitate the marketability and development of
land or to resolve disputes between private parties.
Armed with this knowledge, courts, as well as nonprofit and government holders, will be far better equipped to deal with the coming wave of enforcement
cases in a manner that protects the public interest.

